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Throughout its seventy-two year history, the National Park Service 
has walked a fine line between the two parts of its mission as set 
forth in the Park Service’s organic act of August 25, 1916. Congress 
dictated that the Service provide for the enjoyment of the people, yet, 
at the same time, preserve the nation’s parks unimpaired for future 
generations. The fledgling Park Service’s officials needed to find 
ways of bringing more money to the Service to establish a firm base for 
park system growth. Park Service administrators knew that only by 
attracting more visitors to the parks could the public interest in the 
parks develop, which, in turn, would bring increased appropriations for 
the Service. Throughout the 1920s, Steven Mather and his successor, 
Horace Albright expanded the Park Service’s interests by including 
battlefields, historic sites, and recreation areas under the Service’s 
auspices to provide a greater variety of park experiences for more 
people. Faced with reduced appropriations in the depths of the 
Depression, the Park Service concentrated on the ’’use” aspect of its
dichotomous mission as a way to increase visitation, and therefore,
appropriations.
The Park Service welcomed the establishment of the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) as a harbinger of increased financial
security. The financial resources and the manpower of the CCC enabled 
the Park Service to develop the nation’s parks for tourist comfort. 
This study concentrates on Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks as 
case histories of the National Park Service use of the CCC to develop 
the nation’s parks.
Most of the CCC work projects in Glacier and Yellowstone concentrated 
on making the parks more comfortable or more attractive for visitors. 
Reforestation, campground development, the building of roads and 
trails, fire hazard reduction, and fire fighting were major CCC 
projects designed to achieve those ends in Glacier and Yellowstone 
parks.
Materials used in this study include primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources, including the Glacier and Yellowstone 
superintendents’ annual and monthly reports, Emergency Conservation 
Work/CCC directors* reports and numerous ex-CCC enrollee reminiscences 
proved particularly informative.
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PREFACE
The National Park Service, from its inception in 
1916, has always been faced with a difficult mission. The 
Service’s first director, Steven Tyng Mather, had to 
reconcile dual, and seemingly contradictory goals as set 
forth in the Park Service’s enabling legislation. The Park 
Service was to protect and preserve the national lands 
under its jurisdiction in an unaltered natural state for 
the enjoyment of future generations. At the same time, it 
had to provide for the enjoyment of the people then living. 
When either of these goals is stressed, the other is 
inevitably sacrificed.
The Park Service has never been over-funded. The 
onset of the Depression boded further hard times for the 
fledgling Service. Then, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
established the Civilian Conservation Corps <CCC> in 1933 
to relieve unemployment and protect America’s natural 
resources, the Park Service found a solution to its 
financial problems.
The Civilian Conservation Corps was a landmark agency 
in twentieth century American history in that the 
government, for the first time, wholly accepted providing 
for the welfare of the whole of the American people. The
vi
government, through the CCC, provided food, clothing, 
education, and especially earned income for some of those
Americans who needed it most in the depths of the
Depression of the 1930s. For both the young men and their 
families, the establishment of the CCC promised an
opportunity for a new start. In much the same way, the CCC
provided the National Park Service with new opportunities
for development.
The Park Service took advantage of the huge injection 
of both manpower and funds presented in the CCC to 
undertake a wide variety of projects for which regular 
appropriations were unavailable. The establishment of the 
CCC provided the National Park Service with a tool with
which it could execute an agenda of development. This
development, however, came at some cost to the Park
Service’s original goals. As the Park Service delved into 
this development, it relegated its goal of preservation to 
a secondary position.
National Park Service policies today have returned to 
an emphasis on the preservation of the parks in more
natural states for the future. Any present-day evaluation 
of the Park Service’s policy decisions of the 1930s
necessarily comes from a context which includes today’s 
policies and fifty years of hindsight of Park Service
vii
policy and ideology change and development.
viii
INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed a
bill that established the National Park Service as a 
governmental agency under the United States Department of 
the Interior. Congress stipulated that:
’’the [national park] service. . .shall promote and 
regulate the use of...national parks...by such 
means and measures as to conform to the 
fundamental purpose of the said parks,...to 
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wild life therein and to provide 
for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and 
by such means as will leave them unimpaired for 
the enjoyment of future generations.”
Within these few lines lies the basis of what has been the
National Park Service’s most difficult enigma: balancing
the use of the parks by present generations and the
preservation of the same parks ’’unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.1
In 1918, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane and 
Director of the National Park Service Steven Mather 
wrestled with the new Service’s dichotomous mission. That 
year, Mather wrote a policy statement for Lane to sign. 
This ’’Lane Letter,” the landmark policy directive of the 
National Park Service, clarified the difficult position 
that Mather was in. This statement stipulated that ’’the 
national parks must be maintained in absolutely
unimpaired form for the use of future generations as well
2
as those of our time. . . . ”2 Mather had to juggle 
preservation and use. Proponents of both sides of the 
equation stood waiting to see which route Mather would take
the Park Service.
Mather recognized that preservationists provided much 
of the initial thrust behind the establishment of the 
nation’s parks. He knew that he could not alienate them if 
he were to succeed in expanding the Service. Mather also 
recognized the importance of the railroads in the future 
survival of the park system. Only if the public could get 
to the parks could he have any hope of the Park Service 
gaining the support of the nation. The railroads provided 
major links between the populated East and the parks in the 
West. To make the parks more alluring to the railroads, 
Mather would have to grant them tourist management 
concessions.
The railroads wasted little time in developing their 
claims in Yellowstone and Glacier. In 1886, Jay Cooke’s 
Northern Pacific Railroad began financing the construction 
of major hotels in Yellowstone near the park’s main 
attractions, including the $200,000 Old Faithful Inn and 
the elegant National Hotel at Mammoth Hot Springs. Shortly 
after Glacier became a national park, Louis W. Hill of the 
Great Northern Railroad supervised and financed two 
$500*000 deluxe hotels* one each at East Glacier and on 
Swiftcurrent Lake at Many Glacier. The railroads tried to
3
convince preservationists that the two groups had similar 
goals by supporting the protection of wildlife in the parks 
and "dignified exploitation of our national parks.”
Admittedly, their motives for these attitudes were 
self-serving. The railroads depended on unspoiled scenery 
and abundant wildlife to attract more visitors. While the
railroads and the preservationists had conflicting motives, 
their goals were similar. Even preservationists such as 
John Muir recognized the importance of their close 
coalition to insure the parks’ continued growth.3 
Mather’s Park Service had to please both groups by
reconciling the alternate goals of preservation and
tourism, or use.
Mather believed that increased use of the parks was 
his primary goal. He began publicizing the parks with the 
cooperation of the railroads in an all-out attempt to 
promote tourism in the parks. Mather arranged package
railroad tours, such as the ’’three national park trip,”
consisting of railroad tours of Rocky Mountain,
Yellowstone, and Glacier parks. Also, Mather made it
possible for railroad tourists to arrive at either
Yellowstone’s North, East, or South entrances, on either 
the Northern Pacific, the Burlington, or the Central
Pacific railroads, respectively, and leave the park at any
of the other two entrances to continue their trips on
another railroad at no additional cost. He convinced these
4
three railroads to cooperate in promoting tourist travel to 
Yellowstone. Through increased visitation, Mather hoped to 
secure increased appropriations for the Park Service. He 
claimed that the nation’s parks were ’’lying fallow,” and 
that they needed only ’’proper development to bring them 
into their own.” He purposely used the term ’’fallow” to 
indicate that he saw the parks as ’’fields” needing to be 
developed to harvest their benefits.4
In his attempt to develop the parks, Mather 
authorized increased road building which brought more cars 
to the parks. More and more cars traveling through the 
parks on these new roads made more campgrounds necessary to 
handle the growing numbers of visitors,
Mather was not alone in his belief that the parks 
should be publicized and developed. Mark Daniels, the Park 
Service’s General Superintendent and Landscape Engineer 
believed that ’’every national park. . . in the United States 
is primarily for recreation in its character,” and that the 
’’prime purpose of development of the (national parks) is 
commercial.”s
From its establishment in 1916, the Park Service, 
under Mather and his successors, continued to develop the 
parks for the benefit of the tourists. Throughout the 
post-World War I years, the Park Service under Mather 
continued to grow and mature, and preservation continued to 
be an ideal, not a reality. In 1929, Horace Albright
5
replaced Mather. Albright was Mather’s closest assistant, 
and the new director continued Mather’s developmental 
ideology. In the 1930s, Albright maintained that 
preservation was still only an ’’ideal” and he claimed that 
such ideals ’’cannot be uniformly attained in this day and 
age.”6
By 1933, Albright’s health failed under the stress of 
the directorship, and Arno B, Cammerer took the helm. Many 
preservationists believed that Cammerer’s pro-development 
attitudes were the culmination of Mather’s own ideals. The 
same people who thought Mather and Albright built too many 
roads and catered to tourists in the 1920s found an even 
bigger threat in Cammerer. The establishment of the 
Civilian Conservation Corps <CCC) in 1933 provided the 
National Park Service— under Cammerei with a tool with 
which it could execute an agenda of development at the 
expense of the other goal of preservation. An examination 
of two national parks, Yellowstone and Glacier, provides us 
with a clear example of this development at the expense of 
preservation.
Following F.V. Hayden’s report of his 1871 survey of 
the headwaters of the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers, 
public interest in the Yellowstone area increased. On 
March 1, 1872, after only two days of debate in Congress,
President Ulysses S. Grant signed the world’s first
6
national park into existence.
Yellowstone’s organic act provided ’’for the
preservation, from injury or spoilation...Call of the 
natural] wonders within said park, and their retent ion in 
their natural c o n d i t i o n Yet, on the other hand, animals 
could be killed in the park, so long as they were not used 
for monetary gain. This law did not stop poachers, who, by 
1880, had decimated park herds of buffalo, elk, and 
deer.7
Poachers were not the only ones killing wildlife.
The superintendent of the park in 1880, P.V, Norris,
favored use over preservation as far as the park’s wildlife 
was concerned, and hunted for both recreation and food.
Animals, driven by winter weather into sheltered valleys, 
provided "an abundant winter’s supply of fresh meat, and 
also fine hides of the bear, wolf, and wolverine....Hunting 
in the Park was excellent sport. ...” On August 20, '1386,
the Army moved into the park to protect the wildlife and
the park’s unique wonders. Not until the Lacey Act of
March, 1894, twenty-two years after the park’s
establishment, was all killing of wildlife in Yellowstone 
prohibited.8 Thus, preservationists had made one inroad 
against those who would exploit the park’s resources.
Glacier National Park’s organic act was less 
preservationist than was Yellowstone’s. President William 
Taft signed the bill on May 11, 1910 legislating the
creation of Glacier Park. Prior to the park*a
establishment, the battle between the park’s supporters and 
opponents concluded in the opponents receiving major 
concessions in the park’s organic act, Legislators granted 
both local and national interests concessions in the bill’s 
final form. Mining claims, homestead claims, timber 
harvesting contracts, railroad right-of-way claims, and 
United States Reclamation Service needs all found a place 
in Glacier’s organic act. Gifford Pinchot’s idea of 
’’multiple use” became manifest in Glacier as an ’’hybrid 
forest,”9
Park Service officials held genuinely exploitative 
attitudes. Glacier’s first administrator, William R. 
Logan, viewed preservation as protection of the park from 
outside influences, such as poachers and (non—contracted) 
lumber interests, not as having to keep the park in 
pristine natural condition. Others, such as Dan Doody, one 
of the park’s first assistant rangers, regularly hunted in 
the park for food during the winter months. Park officials 
recognized his skill, and hired him to execute their idea 
of wildlife preservation— the elimination of predators in 
favor of more ’’desirable” species. 10
These long-standing attitudes of development and use 
over those of preservation continued into the 1930s. Park 
Service Director Arno Cammerer sought to express his deeply 
held beliefs in the need to develop further the parks
8
through the work of the CCC.
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CHAPTER 1
Franklin D. Roosevelt: Realizing the Dream
The Civilian Conservation Corps of "the 1930s was but 
one step in the development of the idea of putting the 
unemployed to work for the nation. In 1850, Thomas Carlyle 
said that the unemployed should form ” industrial 
regiments— regiments not to fight the French or other, 
...but to fight the bogs and wilderness at home and 
abroad.”11 In 1920, Harvard philosopher William James 
proposed:
...instead of military conscription a 
conscription of the whole youthful population to 
form for a certain number of years a part of the 
army enlisted against Nature. . . .[Employed thus] 
would our guilded youth be drafted off...to get 
the childishness knocked out of them, and to come 
back into society with healthier sympathies and 
soberer ideas. They would have...done their own 
part in the immemorial human warfare against 
nature; they would tread the earth more proudly, 
they would be better fathers and teachers of the 
following generation. 12
Five years after James first published his thesis, 
George H. Maxwell developed the idea in a much more 
concrete form. He proposed a National Construction Corps 
”organized primarily to fight Nature’s forces instead of to 
fight the people of another nation.” He developed the plan 
further to include the cooperative efforts of the War 
Department, the Interior and Agriculture Departments, and
IQ
the Commerce Department.13
While James and Maxwell were theorizing about putting 
the unemployed to work, many Europeans implemented similar 
plans. World War I had left Bulgaria’s roads in
particularly poor shape. The need for inexpensive road 
repairs led to the establishment of compulsory work camps 
for the nation’s youth. In 1924, Switzerland established 
the Freiwi11iger Arbeitsdienst, or Voluntary Labor 
Service to occupy Swiss unemployed youth. The following 
year, Germany began its own system of youth labor 
camps, ,A
The 1929 Stock Market crash sparked the Great 
Depression, which brought the idea of using the unemployed 
to work on public projects back to the United States. As 
early as 1930, several states had already formed public 
work programs. California, with the largest of these 
programs, established thirty camps throughout the state in 
which transients and the unemployed worked in the state’s 
forests and on its highways. Other states, including 
Washington, Virginia, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, 
and Indiana had similar, yet smaller programs, 15
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), in his home state of 
Mew York, had previously helped the growing forestry 
movement. Appointed as chairman of New York State’s Senate 
Committee on Forests, Fish and Game in 1911, Roosevelt 
introduced and helped pass legislation authorizing
11
state-supervised forestry, FDR knew through experience 
that forestry could rehabilitate poor land. Hyde Park, the 
Roosevelt family estate on the banks of the Hudson River, 
had produced award-winning corn as late as 1840, but by the 
turn of the century, its soil was worn out and nearly 
useless. In 1915, FDR began reforesting the estate, and 
eventually, over five hundred of the estate’s twelve 
hundred acres contained new forests. In 1932, his last 
year as governor of New York, Roosevelt sent 10,000 of the 
state’s unemployed to work on reforestation projects.16
We can see that there was precedence for Roosevelt’s 
CCC. This background makes FDR’s program no less
innovative. Roosevelt implemented a nation-wide program 
which involved 300,000 young men in some 1,400 camps in the 
Corps* first summer alone. These 300,000 men, guided in 
the forests by nearly 26,000 older leaders, provided a 
strong, well-funded work force for those governmental 
agencies involved in the program.
The nation, on March 3, 1933, was in a doldrum.
Faced with Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy in 
Europe, a rapidly arming and increasingly hostile Japan in 
the Pacific, and no end in sight to the economic woes of 
the nation, Americans had little to hope for. The American 
economy foundered as did Americans’ physical health. A 
huge grain surplus bulged storage bins and warehouses in
12
full view of millions of undernourished Americans. The 
same farmers who produced the corn surplus found themselves 
burning their grain to heat their homes— corn was far less 
expensive fuel than coal. "Hoovervilles" sprang up in 
nearly every city, where those who chose to sit the 
Depression out bided their time. Others chose to take to 
the rails, streets, and highways. Those weary travelers, 
who seemed to neither know nor care where they were headed, 
exhibited a ’’restlessness of undirected, unpatterned 
energy.”17 Still worse than the dire condition of the 
economy was the dearth of hope for a better life. The 
Depression showed no signs of lifting. America's economy 
appeared paralyzed.
March 4, the day of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
inauguration, dawned cold and gray, "as dreary as the 
national mood had been...." Roosevelt recited his oath of 
office at 1:00 in the afternoon, and fallowed with a firey 
address in which he vowed "action, and action now!" He 
promised to wage a war against the emergency that faced the 
nation, and to "return the courage and devotion" to a 
disheartened nation. 18
The mood of the nation dramaticaly changed after 
FDR’s first thirty-six hours in office. The doom and 
despair of Saturday, March 4 found no place in the new 
confidence and determination of Monday, March 6. Such was 
the effect of the tone of FDR’s inaugural address and the
13
image of the new president* Roosevelt had so invigorated 
America’s spirit that, in the President’s own words, ’’all 
men and women who love their country” were willing to offer 
the same ’’sacrifice and devotion” as they would in a time 
of war. 19
While the rigors of the depression weighed heavily 
upon the shoulders of adults, it fell even heavier on those 
of youth. Some estimates place unemployment among the 
nation’s young people (those 15-24 years of age) at 
twenty-five percent; this varied from twice as great to a 
third greater than the estimated national unemployment 
average for all ages. 20
The public called on the federal government to stem 
the physical and psychological erosion of the nation’s 
youth. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s Federal Relief
Administrator, meant to avoid direct relief, which promised 
to bring morale-corroding idleness. He favored work 
relief, which gave men a chance to feel useful. He knew 
that it was more expensive than direct doles, but he 
believed that the proponents of direct aid ignored the 
inestimable cost of denying citizens of ’’their sense of 
independence and strength, and their sense of individual 
destiny. ” 21
Not only were America’s youth hit especially hard by 
the Depression but the national parks also sustained an 
almost crippling blow. Promotional campaigns for Glacier
14
and Yellowstone Parks, sponsored by the National Park
Service in cooperation with railroads, oil companies, 
chambers of commerce, concessioners, and automobile 
associations, failed to prevent the closing down of major 
facilities in these parks. In 1933, the Cut Bank and St. 
Marys chalets in Glacier, and the Mammoth and Lake hotels 
in Yellowstone closed their doors.22 Unemployment kept 
people away from the parks. One of the first salvoes that 
Roosevelt fired in his war against unemployment was the 
Civilian Conservation Corps,
Roosevelt began espousing his idea for a national
agency to deal with the growing unemployment problem in
1932. On July 2, 1932, during his nomination acceptance
speech before the Democratic National Convention, FDR 
hinted at the CCC. By the beginning of 1933, the 
unemployment situation had clearly worsened, and nearly 
13,700,000 Americans were out of work. That represented 
over ten percent of the nation* s population. This
unemployment indirectly affected over 40,000,000 people, or 
nearly thirty-three percent of the population.23
To deal with this growing mass of jobless people,
United States Senator James Couzens of Michigan proposed in 
January, 1933, that the Army administer ’’Citizens’ Military 
Training Camps.” Under Couzens* bill, the Army would
house, clothe, and feed 300,000 unemployed youth. The Army 
insisted, however, that it could accommodate only 68,000.
15
This bill failed to pass twice, but it succeeded in one
thing: it linked the Army with relief work.24
Even before Roosevelt’s inauguration, he began to
assemble a group of key people he knew he would need to
realize his CCC plan. On March 14, 1933, the
President-elect sent notes to the secretaries of War, 
Agriculture, Interior, and Labor, asking them to develop 
plans for his Emergency Conservation Work (ECW). 25 The 
secretaries responded the following day with proposals for 
the program. Armed with this support, FDR sent Congress 
his proposal on March 21. He recommended creating:
..,a civilian conservation corps to be used in 
simple work, not interfering with normal 
employment, and confining itself to forestry, the 
prevention of soil erosion, flood control and 
similar projects. . . . This type of work is of 
definite, practical value, not only through the 
prevention of great present financial loss, but 
also as a means of creating future national 
wealth.
More important, however, than the material 
gains will be the moral and spiritual value of 
such work.... We can take a vast army of 
unemployed out into healthful surroundings....
It is not a panacea for all the unemployment, but 
it is an essential step in this emergency.26
From the beginning of the ECW, Roosevelt had two main
goals for the new agency: to help the young men of the
nation to rebuild their health and confidence through
gainful employment, and to stem the tide of destruction of
the nation’s natural resources. Although Roosevelt ’’felt
the scars and exhaustion of the earth almost as personal
16
injuries,” his immediate objective in the establishment of 
the CCC was the relief of unemployment,27
While the original intent of the CCC was unemployment 
relief, the central goals for the Corps shifted slightly 
away from relief for the jobless as the CCC progressed. 
The ECW Act of April 5, 1937 stated that the CCC was
established to provide ’’employment, as well as vocational 
training-, for youthful citizens. . .who are unemployed. . . .” 
The emphasis changed again in 1939. As a part of his
Reorganization Plan Number One of July 1, 1939, Roosevelt
shifted the administration of the CCC to the Federal 
Security Agency along with the Social Security Board, the 
U.S. Office of Education, the Public Health Service, and 
the National Youth Administration. FDR chose the Federal
Security Agency instead of the Federal Works Agency because 
he saw that the CCC’s ’’major purpose is to promote the 
welfare and further the training of the individuals who 
make up the corps, important as may be the construction 
work which they have carried on so successfully.”28
Under the Federal Security Agency in 1940 and 1941, 
the emphasis of the CCC changed a third time. In the heat 
of mobilization for war, the CCC became less of a training 
program and more of a ’’defense” agency. More attention 
focused on how much the CCC accomplished for the war 
effort, especially in American Forests magazine articles 
such as ’’The Forest Goes to War” and ’’Wood Goes Down to the
17
Sea in Fighting Ships” in 1942. Also, nearly three million 
men had learned group living, how to follow and give 
orders, proper sanitation, first-aid, and personal hygiene 
practices. Many others learned skills valuable to the war 
effort such as driving trucks and heavy equipment, vehicle 
maintenance, radio operation, cooking, and typing.29
Shortly after the enabling legislation reached 
Congress, the program’s critics began to speak out. The 
most vocal opponent of the bill was the president of the 
American Federation of Labor, William Green. His primary 
criticism of the program dealt with the enrollees’ pay and 
regimentation. Green feared that the proposed rate of pay, 
SI. 00 per day, could become recognized as standard pay, 
thereby depressing the economy by lowering regular labor 
wages. His second major criticism was that the
regimentation caused by Army administration of the CCC 
’’smacks. . . of fascism, of Hitlerism, and of a form of 
soviet ism, ” 30
Southern congressmen also railed against the bill. 
The CCC, according to them, promised to sap away all of the 
funds from their pet river and harbor projects. Section 
four of the bill stipulated that the CCC had access to 
previously appropriated, but unobliged public works funds. 
Southern senators voted to remove this section, but the 
House subsequently reinserted it.3'
Other critics claimed that the bill was unrealistic,
18
or even dangerous to the American family. Herbert Hoover’s 
Secretary of Agriculture, Arthur M. Hyde, thought FDR’s 
reforestation plan was of an ’’utterly visionary and 
chimerical character.” He also claimed that 1,000,000 men 
could totally deplete the nation’s stock of trees in 
nurseries in only three hours. Another critic denounced 
the bill by claiming that the program would ’’take men away 
from their families, take the husband away from the wife, 
the father away from the children,”32
These critics effected many changes in the bill's 
structure. Of all the sections, only the enactment clause 
remained unchanged. Critics, particularly Illinois
Representative Oscar DePriest, who claimed that FDR 
discriminated against blacks, fought to insert the clause 
in the bill which stated that "no discrimination shall be 
made on account of race, color, or creed.”33
The bill’s final form was a greatly reduced version 
of its first draft. The bill was so abbreviated that it 
left extraordinary powers in Roosevelt’s hands. The final 
form of the bill mandated the President ”to provide for 
employing citizens of the United States.” It avoided 
placing limits on his power by using such terminology as 
"as he may prescribe...” or "as the President may determine 
to be desirable. . . . ”3* FDR, however, used his 
discretionary powers to enact the kind of CCC he intended 
in the first draft of the bill. This angered many of the
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congressmen who fought for changes in the bill. One reason 
Congress left the enabling legislation so open-ended was to 
allay criticism of Congress by the public. This tactic 
provided for nearly unanimous public approval of the 
program, 3S
When the news of the act’s passage reached the
public, nearly everyone supported it. Not only did the
vast majority of Democrats back the program, but most of 
the Republican party favored the CCC as well. Even such a 
recalcitrant ”FDR hater” as Robert R. McCormick, the 
publisher of the Chicago Tribune praised it in his 
numerous editorials.36 Two groups opposed the program.
A few freshly discharged soldiers claimed that it was
absurd for the government to discharge 15,000 soldiers as a 
cost-saving measure, and then hire hundreds of thousands of 
men at nearly twice the army wage. The other main group
who opposed the CCC was organized labor. They feared a 
loss of jobs among higher-paid union members. 37
Roosevelt stemmed most of organized labor’s 
criticisms by appointing Robert Fechner, a vice-president 
of the American Federation of Labor, as Director of the new 
CCC. Fechner had risen through the membership of the 
International Association of Machinists. Roosevelt knew of 
Fechner’s skills as a negotiator and mediator because of 
Fechner’s mediation of the 1917 Boston & Maine Railroad 
strike. Fechner chose his close friend of twenty years,
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James J. McEntee, to be his assistant. The Director took
his oath of office on April 5. Fechner predicted the
direction in which he would take the corps: just as in
1917, when the nation "mobilized” to fight another nation, 
in 1933, the nation would mobilize ”to fight a war against 
waste.” Executive Order 6101, which appointed Fechner as 
director, also established the CCC Advisory Council.38
To accomplish his goal of having 250,000 young men in 
the forests by mid—summer, FDR needed the cooperation of 
four departments of his cabinet. Representatives from the 
Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and the Interior 
formed the CCC Advisory Council. Roosevelt determined each 
department’s role in a pencil sketch he made on April 3, 
1933, and he wanted ’’personally to check on the location 
and scope of the camps, assign work done, etc.”39 This 
highly centralized program operated with suprising 
smoothness.
The complex web of administrative authority between
the four departments involved contributed to the Corps’
smooth operation. The dedication shown by the
representatives on the Advisory Council also helped the CCC 
get off to a good start. The members of the first Advisory 
Council were Colonel Duncan Major, of the War Department’s 
General Staff Operations and Training Division, W. Frank 
Persons, Director of the United States Employment Service, 
Major Robert Y. Stuart, Chief Forester of the United States
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Forest Service, under the Department of Agriculture, and 
Horace M. Albright, Director of the National Park Service, 
under the Department of the Interior.40 Each of the 
departments had a specific role in the CCC.
Roosevelt logically directed. the Department of 
Labor to administer the selection of the enrollees for the 
CCC. The Department did not actually select the men. 
Rather, it established a set of guidelines and standards by 
which state and local unemployment agencies and boards of 
public welfare accepted men for service in the CCC.42 
Roosevelt originally instructed the selecting agencies to 
choose young men that could benefit their communities the 
most when he made it clear that the CCC was not established 
to clear the riffraff out of the cities. 42 The state and 
local unemployment agencies, however, showed little regard 
for FDR’s wishes. The CCC’s high desertion rate made it 
clear that many of the young men originally enrolled into 
the CCC either were not willing to work or they joined just 
for the free clothes, a cross-country ride, and some 
meals. Also, some enrollees were the sons of wealthy men, 
who saw the CCC as a good way to straighten the boys 
out. 43
The Labor Department established not only standards 
for accepting enrollees, but also quotas, based on the 
state’s population, to guide the local boards. The Labor 
Department also established quotas for Local Experienced
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Men (LEMs), older locals hired as foremen and supervisors, 
and based those quotas on population and the availability 
of men near the work site.44
The President took full advantage of his powers under 
the CCC’s enabling legislation to provide work to another 
group of men. On May 9, 1933, nearly 3,000 veterans 
marched as the Bonus Expeditionary Force and descended upon 
Washington. These veterans demanded advance payment of war 
bonds that were to mature in 1940. FDR responded to this 
crisis much more coolly than had President Hoover, who had 
used the United States Army under General Douglas MacArthur 
to disperse the first veteran marchers and burn their 
shanty town. FDR saw to it that the men were housed and 
fed. Later, he firmly but gently urged their dispersal. 
In Executive Order #6129, he suspended the CCC age 
limitations for veterans and allowed them to join the 
corps. Many of the marchers took advantage of Roosevelt’s 
offer, and the rest returned home unsatisfied. Later, 
veterans entered the CCC through the Veteran’s 
Administration. 45
The ECW Act afforded Roosevelt the power to include 
still other groups into the CCC fold. The legislation made 
no provision for the employment of Native Americans, but 
Roosevelt decided that three percent of the CCC’s total 
strength should be Indians (10,000 in a corps strength of 
300,000) and that 5,000 territorials from the Virgin
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Islands and Hawaii should be eligible for enrollment. «
While the act stipulated that no one was to be
discriminated against because of his race, color, or creed, 
blacks in the CCC did not receive equal treatment.
Roosevelt and his assistants were victims of their time, 
and were bound by unfavorable public attitudes toward
Negroes. FDR decided that Negroes should be enrolled in 
proportion to their number in the nation* s general
population. Since the 1930 federal census showed that 
blacks made up approximately ten percent of the general 
population, they would have similar representation in the 
CCC.47 The CCC was extremely attractive to many blacks 
because, for the first time for most of them, they worked 
for the same wages as did whites. Paying the blacks 
similar wages did not make the CCC*s treatment of them 
equal to that of the white enrollees.
Blacks were discriminated against in their camps as 
well an in nearby towns. Discriminatory attitudes among 
the enrollees themselves seemed to be the rule rather than 
the exception. When a number of white companies protested 
the presence of a Negro company nearby, the blacks almost 
always moved out. While most blacks lived and worked in 
segregated companies, the only mention of them in either 
Glacier or Yellowstone was that an integrated New York 
company occupied GNP-8, Anaconda Creek for part of 1933 and 
1934. There was rampant discrimination on the part of the
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whites in this company. The GNP-8 camp commander and the 
camp’s project superintendent sent six white local Montanan 
enrollees to extended service at GNP-1, presumably to avoid 
interracial problems. Partly as a result of
discrimination, desertion and dishonorable discharge rates 
among the blacks and the remaining white enrollees were 
extremely high. By October, 1934, desertions left the
company strength at sixty-one blacks and fifteen whites.
Outside of camp, blacks fared no better. Belton merchants 
were extremely prejudiced against the camp’s black 
enrollees. Many shopkeepers posted signs reading ”We cater 
to white trade only.”48
In the rush to get the enrollees into the parks and
forests by July, 1933, the government began a massive
mobilization of men and supplies. In fact, the government 
mobilized more men in the three months after Congress 
passed the CCC act than it did during the entire
Spanish-American War. In the first three months of World 
War I, the Army processed 181,000 men, but in the same
length of time in 1933, the Army processed 275,000 men. An 
average of 8,700 young men entered the CCC per day between 
May 12 and June 7. The single highest daily enrollment was 
13,843 men on June 1. Originally, CCC companies received 
replacements every six months. As desertions exacted a 
greater and greater toll on corps strengths, Feohner
authorized alternate acceptance periods. Some of the
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renewal drives held on the first day of each quarter 
(January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1) to rebuild the 
corps’ strength totalled over 162,000. 49 Roosevelt knew 
that the only agency that could handle these numbers of men 
was the Army.
Since Senator Couzens introduced his bill in January, 
1933, calling for the Army’s involvement in unemployment 
relief, the War Department had been gearing up for some 
kind of a major role in relief programs, and, by the time 
the CCC was starting to grow in April, the Army was ready 
for the corps. The original role of the Army in the CCC 
was conditioning, clothing, and transportation of the 
enrollees to their camps. From there, the technical 
agencies (Departments of Agriculture and Interior) were to 
operate the camps and the work projects. The technical 
agencies quickly realized that they had neither the men, 
the money, the equipment, nor the experience to administer
the CCC’s camps. The Army accepted these responsibilities
of camp administration.
The CCC mobilization was essentially trouble-free 
primarily because the United States Army was ideally suited 
to handle this large influx of men and equipment. Faced
with this flood of 300,000 men, the Army fell back on a
familiar organizational style. The Army used the form of 
its own two hundred-man companies under leaders and 
assistants as the basis for the CCC camps. The food was
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similar to Army rations, and the clothing was Army issue. 
Also, the War Department already had an established
contract system for supply purchases.
The War Department’s job in the administration of the 
CCC began with the acceptance of eligible enrollees from 
the Labor Department and the Veteran’s Administration. 
After this initial acceptance, the Army administered
physical examinations much like those for Army recruits. 
The Army had command of the enrollees from this point until 
their discharge, including ’’reconditioning, organization, 
administration, transportation, supply, sanitation, medical 
care, hospitalization, discipline, welfare, and
education.” The Army also built and dismantled camps, and 
provided the technical agencies with men for project
work. 50
Regardless of how well suited the Army was for the 
administration of the CCC, the public was uncomfortable
about the military running the camps. The Assistant
Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring, did not allay these 
fears in the article he wrote for Liberty Magazine,
There, he called the boys of the CCC ’’economic storm
troops” and ’’the forerunners of the great civilian labor
armies of the future.” As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. pointed 
out, these were not very well chosen words for a nation 
that was just learning to hate Hitler. In reaction to the 
article, the public flooded Washington with letters of
protest, forcing Roosevelt to demand a public apology. 
Woodring quickly complied. 61
Some of the Army personnel resented their association 
with the CCC. Besides the animosity that arose from the 
differences between the amount of pay the enrollees
received and the amount soldiers received, some officers 
disliked dealing with the undisciplined CCCs. 52
The final two departments of the cabinet involved
were the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, or the
’’technical agencies.” While these two agencies cooperated 
for their mutual benefit on the Advisory Council, the 
National Park Service, under the Department of the
Interior, and the United States Forest Service, under the 
Department of Agriculture occasionally collided. As the 
National Park Service grew, some state forests became state 
parks. The transfer of those state forest camps, from the 
control of the Forest Service, to state park camps, under 
control of the Park Service, made the Forest Service 
believe that the Park Service was trying to steal 
foresters. Meanwhile, the Park Service accused the Forest 
Service of packing Army headquarter offices with liaison 
officers sympathetic to the Forest Service.53
Another source of Park Service animosity toward the 
Forest Service was Fechner’s authorization for Forest 
Service development of recreational facilities in the 
national forests. Many times, these facilities duplicated
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or competed with similar facilities in the state or
national parks completed by the Park Service. 54
Besides these differences, the Park Service and the 
Forest Service had different administrative forms for their 
work project execution. Forest Service camps were divided 
into platoons. Each platoon consisted of three sections, 
each under a foreman, and each section contained
subsections under enrollee leaders. The subsections were 
made up of the lowest division, squads of six or seven
men. These squads all performed basically the same kinds
of work. Park Service camp commanders administered work 
projects differently. Each camp had an experienced
engineer, a ’’technical forester,” trained landscape men,
history and wildlife specialists. All of these divisions 
worked under one project supervisor. Companies were 
divided into squads or groups under these supervisory
personnel, and each group did its own particular job
(landscaping, forestry, historical work, or road and bridge 
work) . ss
The cooperation of these four cabinet departments
enabled a rapid implementation of FDR’s nation-wide plan. 
Only thirty-seven days after his inauguration, local 
selection boards admitted the CCC’s first enrollees. By 
the end of the summer of 1933, there were camps in every 
state in the union except for Delaware. By the end of the 
CCC in 1942, camps spread from Maine to Hawaii, and from
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Alaska to the Virgin Islands, se
This nation-wide program provided the National Park 
Service with the manpower and funding support it needed to 
continue on the developmental course Mather had charted. 
The Service continued to emphasize developing new 
recreational areas over the stewardship of the national 
parks in their natural states. The CCC provided a ready 
vehicle for this agenda of development.
The establishment of the CCC changed more than the 
Park Service’s level of funding for development. At the 
beginning of the New Deal, the Park Service had 2,027 
employees. By 1940, there were 7,341 employees of the Park 
Service. This 262 percent increase in the size of the 
Service in only seven years demonstrates the swelling 
typical of many governmental bureaucracies in the New 
Deal. Increases in regular appropriations do not
completely explain this expansion. While the Park 
Service’s total of appropriations increased somewhat over
the decade (1930: 310,820,620; 1940: 313,557,815), it
received 3218,000,000 for emergency conservation projects. 
Moreover, Congress cut Park Service appropriations in 1934 
by more than fifty percent (from 310,820,000 to 
35,085,000). The Emergency Conservation Work clearly
financed a portion of the Park Service’s expansion. 57
Not until the early 1930s, did Park Service officials 
know what direction the long-range expansion and
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development of the national parks would take. Beginning in 
1931, under Director Albright, the Service began to draw up 
’’master plans” by which administrators could guide the 
expansion and development of the nation’s parks. Officials 
planned actual work based on regular appropriations; 
because of budgetary constraints, this work did not include 
broad conservation projects. Consequently, park officials 
had no assurance and little hope for the completion of 
these master plans developed for the years ahead. Park 
administrators viewed these plans as unrealistic in the 
face of reduced federal appropriations for the Park 
Service. Backed by the money and manpower of the CCC, 
however, the Park Service was able to reevaluate and
rewrite realistic project plans.
These master plans were the primary reason that the
CCC fitted so quickly and so well into the Park Service 
work projects. Park Service policy required development
plans for six years ahead of date so that the Service would 
be able to use effectively any unexpected appropriations. 
Because of these plans, Park Service officials were not 
caught unprepared for the corps, in spite of the swiftness 
of the CCC’s implementation. The CCC quickly exhausted 
these six-year plans, which made further planning 
necessary. Guided by the the National Park Service’s
master plans, the CCC proved to be an effective tool for
park development.68
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CHAPTER 2:
The Enrol lees in "the Camps
The United States Army was extremely well suited to 
administer the camps. The Army used more than its standard 
200-man camp model for CCC camp operation guidelines. The 
military’s ’’meticulous attention to cleanliness, good 
order, personal appearance of [the personnel], and 
individual and general sanitation [and] the standards of 
interior economy” guided all of the camps’ operation. Camp 
commanders were either activated reservists or transferred 
from active duty elsewhere. They held all of the power of 
Army commanders and followed normal functions of the Army, 
except for military training and discipline, and had final 
authority for all aspects of camp operation.59
These camps provided almost all of the basic 
necessities for the young men of the CCC. The first need 
that the camp fulfilled when the enrollees arrived at camp 
sites was shelter. The CCC boys had to erect their tents 
if they were not up already. Most of the CCC’s camps in 
Glacier and Yellowstone were summer camps, in which the CCC 
boys slept on straw mattresses and cots in ten or 
twelve-man tents with wooden plank floors and walls. The 
enrollees of the Fort Missoula CCC District, which included 
all of Glacier and YNP-1, Mammoth, had reason to celebrate
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in "the summer of 1935. It was not until then that Fort
Missoula’s supplies caught up with demands and the Army 
could issue sturdier cots, real mattresses and mattress 
covers to replace the straw-stuffed wool sack 
mattresses.60 Since all of the enrollees traveled east
or south for other camps during the CCC's first winter, 
canvas tents provided sufficient summertime shelter.
In the summer of 1933, American Forest Products,
Incorporated protested against the use of canvas tents in 
the CCC camps and argued in favor of wooden barracks.
Fechner liked the idea of housing enrollees in wooden
camps, and ordered their construction. By November of that 
year, the CCC claimed to have over 40,000 carpenters
building camps in forty-six states out of nearly
300,000,000 board-feet of lumber. The second year of the 
CCC saw the introduction of the wooden barracks in the 
corps. By 1935, prefabricated wooden camps were the
standard for year-round camps, while most summer camps
continued to use tents. 61
At least one of the camps’ structures did not provide 
sufficient shelter. The latrine was notoriously lacking in 
comfort. One latrine in particular merited mention in a 
letter home. Enrollee Alfred Strode in Glacier Park wrote 
to his mother that ’’the worst feature C of the camp was] the 
defecation trench. Mosquitos bite the H— 1 out of you when 
you sit down.”62 Besides providing shelter for the
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enrollees, the CCC also clothed the young men.
Clothing the CCCs was one of the reasons that the 
Army took over the administration of the corps. The Army 
not only had tons of stored Army-issue clothing, but it
also had the built-in mechanism for acquiring more
clothing: the Quartermaster Corps. To supply the CCC, the
Quartermaster General placed orders for 2,500,000 yards of 
denim, 500,000 pairs of shoes, and 1,250,000 pairs of 
trousers. The original government clothing issue to each 
enrollee included three pairs of underwear, six pairs of 
socks, one pair of shoes, two pairs of denim pants, one 
pair of wool pants, two flannel shirts, one tie, one belt, 
one hat, one raincoat, one overcoat and one pair of
gloves. 63
Much of this clothing had been previously used.
Among the used items of clothing enrollee Alfred Strode
received was his shoes. He wrote to his mother that they 
were ”a year and a half old & worn. , . He also received a
used mess kit with "John J. Roach, A.E.F. 1919” scratched 
into the back. His pants, however, were new but fit him 
extremely poorly: size 40 waist, 32 inseam. Some companies
began to stay in the parks for the winter in 1934-1935,
which made winter clothing necessary. The winter issue
included, in addition to the standard issue, three pairs of 
long underwear. Enrollee Burton Appleton from New York 
found that this issue was insufficient for the long Glacier
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winters, and claimed that the enrollees were "not clothed
properly for [winter woods] work.” The CCC’s clothing 
gradually became more appropriate as summei— issue clothes 
consisted of comfortable cotton khaki instead of the Army’s 
wool olive drab fatigues. By 1939, the CCC had replaced
the Army’s dress olive drab and had adopted its own spruce 
green dress uniform. 64
Food was another item that the Army demonstrated it 
could deliver cheaply. Unfortunately, the S.37 per day per 
enrollee bought little more than regular Army rations. The 
food was not always palatable, but it was usually
nutritious and varied. The menu changed daily, but staples 
usually remained the same. Most breakfasts featured eggs 
and bacon or ham, hash browns or biscuits, canned fruit, 
toast, butter, milk, and coffee. Lunches, when served in 
the camp, usually consisted of meat (stew or roast), 
potatoes, two vegetables, pudding, and coffee. Trail 
lunches consisted of sandwiches, pie» and coffee. Dinner 
was the main meal, and the only meal when the CCC boys
could eat at their leisure. Braised beef or veal, mashed
potatoes, two vegetables, fruit salad, biscuits, pie 
(sometimes with ice cream), coffee, and tea tided the 
hungry boys over until breakfast the next morning.65
The quality of the food was inconsistent from camp to 
camp. Some enrollees enjoyed the good food, and ate well. 
A camp observer reported witnessing 2,200 pancakes consumed
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in a single sitting in a standard 200-inan camp. Others 
found the food neither satisfying nor plentiful. One 
Glacier camp, GNP-15, was known throughout the area for
having the worst food around, se
Poor food caused most of the low morale problems in
the CCC camps, and mess strikes were a popular form of
protest. One such strike occurred in GNP-15. The
enrollees ’’all marched in and were seated as they always 
were. Plates were filled and someone whistled. They all
lined up to the garbage cans with their filled plates and 
dumped them without anyone taking a bite.” Another popular 
form of protest was a work strike. In a Yellowstone Park
camp one day, 125 enrollees refused to work until they got
better food. Some of the mess strikes turned violent. One 
camp commander narrowly averted violence when he threatened 
to use his .45 calibre pistol if anyone threw his (cold 
boiled) potato at him. Junior officers instigated other 
protests. Charles Green, a Project Superintendent in 
GNP-15, was one of those officers:
. . .one morning after C a] breakfast of black 
coffee, burned toast and wormy oatmeal, I told 
the Camp Commander I was refusing to take the 
boys to work until after they had something to
eat. An hour later after they had been given
some bacon and eggs, I accepted them for 
work. 67
Nost of the time, camp cooks did wonders with what 
they had to work with. There were frequent shortages of
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fresh food such as milk and butter. One camp experienced a 
lengthy shortage of beef. The cook at that camp improvised 
by augmenting the camp’s larder with wild meat. He shot 
porcupines with an unauthorized gun, dressed them out, and 
cooked them in stews like beef. The boys were so happy to 
have meat that they did not notice the difference. When 
the camp commander asked about the meat, he found out about 
the gun, and supplied the camp with plenty of beef 
thereafter. The CCC boys in camps where the food was 
particularly poor got frequent breaks from the cursed 
cuisine during the fire seasons. Whenever the CCC boys 
were away from camp on fire detail, the Park Service had to 
feed them. The Park Service food was very good, and the 
boys regretted going back to camp.68
While the CCC attempted to provide adequate health 
care for the CCC boys, most CCC camps shared a doctor with 
two or even three other camps. With physicians spread so 
thinly, it is a wonder that the enrollees stayed as healthy 
as they did. In spite of the best efforts of the CCC 
doctors, disease still exacted a stiff toll.69 Many 
camps had to be quarantined, especially in Yellowstone 
Park. Yellowstone camps YNP-1, YNP-5, and YNP-7 were
quarantined more than any of the other camps. Two- or 
three-week quarantines for scarlet fever, mumps, diptheria, 
or measles were the most common in Yellowstone. Influenza 
and waves of other diseases swept through CCC camps
37
throughout the Vest. In one Yellowstone camp, a 1937 
influenza outbreak spared but six enrollees from the entire 
camp. 70
In spite of these health risks, the enrollees as a 
whole were much healthier when they left the CCC than when 
they entered. At enrollment, twenty-five percent of the 
CCC boys were below the minimum acceptable weight for
induction into the Army, and seventy-five percent were
below the Army’s desired weight. At the time of discharge, 
only four percent were below the Army’s minimum weight, and 
eighty-four percent who were below weight gained enough to 
get into the Army. The average enrollee gained from eight 
to twelve pounds while he was in the CCC. The CCCs were 
also healthier than their non-CCC counterparts. The 
tuberculine death rate for males, age 15-29 in the general 
population was .4 per 1,000 in 1938. In the CCC, the death 
rate for tuberculosis was only .06 per 1,000. The overall 
mortality rate per 1,000 for the general population of
boys <15—29) was 8.07, but for the CCC it was 2.87, CCC 
officials attributed this to the good food, exercise, 
regular hours, and plenty of sleep of the CCC. Not only 
were their bodies healthier, so too were their teeth. In 
1937, CCC dental teams filled 300,000 teeth and pulled 
170,000 others. Director Fechner estimated that ’’over 
ninety percent of this volume of dental attention never 
would have been received had these young men not have
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enrolled in the CCC.”71
Another aspect of the CCC’s concern for the health of 
the enrollees was its safety program. This program, 
initiated in February 1934, had dual goals: 1) the
elimination of physical hazards; and 2) minimizing human 
hazards. To accomplish these goals, the CCC concentrated 
training on five areas: transportation (there were 40,000 
vehicles in the CCC), first aid, handling of tools, fire 
protection for the camps themselves, and Red Cross 
lifesaving. 72 An alarming number of accidental deaths 
and injuries in the first months of the corps made this 
safety program necessary. The Advisory Council initiated 
the ’’Safety First!” campaign to carry out this training.
The ’’Safety First!” campaign helped reduce the CCC 
injury rate throughout the life of the corps.73 This 
program involved lectures, bulletins, incentives, and 
weekly meetings which kept the CCC boys thinking about 
safety in the camps and at work. Another part of the 
program insured that not only were the CCC trucks safe, but 
that those enrollees assigned to drive CCC vehicles knew 
how to do so safely. CCC drivers and mechanics regularly 
inspected all trucks. Some drivers lost their licenses 
’’due to negligence and Clack of] proper care of equipment, 
and speed,”74 It is a tribute to both luck and the 
Safety First! campaign that no more CCC boys were killed in 
the CCC than actually were, considering the great amount
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of time the enrollees spent working in Glacier’s and
Yellowstone’s forests.
The CCC’s daily schedule established times for more 
than just work in the woods. 75 Evenings and weekends 
provided the CCCs with a welcomed respite from their work. 
While their evenings were the enrollees’ own recreation 
time, camp commanders reserved Saturday mornings for camp 
work (Appleton claimed that ’’Saturdays were devoted to the 
Army.” ), or to make up work time lost during the week due 
to inclement weather. Saturday afternoons, the enrollees
could engage in a wide varity of recreational activities.
The camps had no official CCC funds with which they could 
buy athletic equipment, but local communities usually 
donated some sports equipment. Also, companies used the 
proceeds from their camp canteen, or snack bar to buy the 
equipment. Saturday evenings, those enrollees who so 
desired to could usually find a ride into town to see a 
movie or attend local dances. On Sundays, ministers from 
various denominations visited the camps. After religious 
services, the enrollees had the rest of the day to 
themselves to do with as they pleased. For those who chose 
not .to partake in games and talk, the CCC had an 
educational program of classes and lectures in a wide 
variety of subjects.
The CCC educational program evolved over time out of 
need. FDR wanted some sort of an educational program for
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the CCC, so he appointed Dr. Clarence Marsh as the CCC 
Director of Education in 1933, one year before the CCC 
educational program was formalized in June, 1934. Within 
three months of FDR’s approval of the program, 654 
educational advisors were on duty in the CCC camps. FDR 
favored an educational program of voluntary classes because 
he sought to interest some of the enrollees, upon 
discharge, in working in the nation’s forests. Roosevelt
believed that if the CCC were to provide young men with
practical education in forestry, they would prefer work in
the forests to returning to the cities and unemployment. 
Further, the CCC educational program offered a perfect way 
to hire unemployed teachers and help the enrollees. 
Although he favored this idea, Roosevelt also saw the 
potential for the CCC classrooms to become fertile ground
for ’’radical and leftist infiltration.” The Army was wary 
of the CCC educational system also. Colonel Duncan Major 
on the Advisory Council, claimed:
Instead of teaching the boys how to do an honest 
day’s work we are going to be forced to accede to 
the wishes of the long-haired men and 
short-haired women, and spend most of the time on 
some kind of an educational course.75
While CCC classes were voluntary, camp officials 
urged all CCC boys to take part in the program. 77 One 
critic of the CCC educational program, James Howard Hull, 
claimed that ”a very small percentage of the CCC boys are
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inspired by the same thirst for knowledge which committed 
Ben Franklin in his early youth to the drastic schedule of 
laboring days and studying nights.” This criticism 
notwithstanding, the urging evidently paid off, since by 
1939, 91,3% of the enrollees regularly attended some sort
of class. 78 However, not all of these classes were 
academic.
Many CCC boys took classes in history, arithmetic, 
English, and foreign languages, but the majority were more 
interested in vocational training. Tension built between 
the Army, which ran the educational programs, and the 
Departments of Agriculture and Interior. These tensions 
centered around whether or not the Army was best able to 
operate the vocational training program. Assistant 
director McEntee resolved this tension on May 21, 1937,
when he signed an agreement between the Army, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the
Interior. The agreement stipulated that while the Army
controlled all academic instruction, job training, both
on-the-job and after hours, was the responsibility of the 
technical agencies. Furthermore, any vocational training 
not connected with the work project at hand, such as 
cooking, clerical and supply work, was the responsibility 
of the Army alone.79
The Army had lofty, yet well established goals for 
its educational program.30 The Army’s ultimate goal was
42
to return Mto the normal work-a-day world, citizens better 
equipped mentally and morally for their duties as such and 
with a better knowledge of the Government under which they 
live and of all that that Government means. 81
Individual states supported the CCC educational 
program. In April, 1936, all CCC camps in Montana became 
fully accredited institutions for ’’preparing men for 
elementary and secondary school completion in conjunction
with the local, county, and city systems.” In early 1938,
the State of Montana was the first officially to designate
the CCC camps in the state as technical high schools.
Other states followed Montana’s lead, and by 1939,
forty-one states granted credit for classwork done in the 
CCC camps. During the 1939-1940 school year, 159 schools 
and colleges granted 564 scholarships to enrollees.
Enrollees benefited educationally not only through their 
classes, but also through the work projects. Fechner
believed that the CCC project work should provide:
...an outstanding opportunity to teach enrollees 
the skills and operations involved on the job 
assigned, good work habits, the dignity of labor, 
and the meaning of a day’s work. In addition, it 
should be used to aid the men in discovering the
types of work for which they are best fitted and
in developing the skills necessary for entrance 
into employment.
The huge size of the CCC enabled many young men to go
through its academic and vocational training program
<400,000 in 1939). This, according to Fechner, made the
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CCC "one of the country’s major educational and training 
agencies. ” 02
Another popular part of the CCC educational program 
was the lecture series that the park rangers delivered to 
the CCC boys in Glacier and Yellowstone. Glacier
Superintendent Eivind Scoyen, in the ”CCC Lectures” section 
of his Superintendent's Annual Reports noted that by far 
the most popular lectures in Glacier dealt with the park’s 
natural history and wildlife. The CCC enrollees in Glacier 
were lucky to have the opportunity to listen to renowned 
authorities such as Richard Mahard, a geologist from 
Columbia University, Rene Blondeau, a botanist from the 
University of Montana, and Dr. Alton Lindsey, a biologist 
from the American University in Washington, D.C., all of 
whom were seasonal rangers in the park.
CCC officials had statistics to back them up when 
they claimed that the CCC educational program was a huge 
success. Teachers educated tens of thousands of illiterate 
enrollees in the CCC; during the 1939 fiscal year, 8,936 
illiterates learned to read and write. During that same 
year, 5,176 enrollees received eighth grade diplomas, 1,048 
graduated from high school, and 97 earned college degrees. 
The CCC vocational education program churned out 45,000 
truck drivers, 7,500 bridge builders, 2,000 bakers, and 
1,500 welders per year.03
Improved discipline was a welcomed result of the
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CCC educational program, since discipline had been a steady 
problem in the corps. Roosevelt believed that, to keep the 
fears of militarism in the CCC to a minimum, camp 
commanders should not impose military discipline. Rather,
disciplinary measures were to be like those ”customarily 
imposed by the management in industrial enterprises in 
order to maintain efficiency of production and equality of 
opportunity and privileges for those employed.”84
Discipline seemed to derive from the enrollees
themselves— from their own fear of dishonorable discharge 
Cand the resulting unemployment and hunger) and from their 
own ’’practical social discipline.” This practical
discipline caused loafers or ’’gold brickers” to either pull
their own weight or go ’’over the hill” and desert.85
Captain David E. Washburn, commander of a CCC company in 
Glacier, claimed that ’’without strict military regulations 
the boys in camp were put on their own in a matter of 
self-government. . . . Within a week. . .rowdyism had become 
both unfashionable and unpopular. As self-governing young 
Americans, these youths found their own way of eliminating 
or taming the bully and tough guy.”86 Dishonorable 
discharge was not really a deterrent or punishment, but it 
did solve part of the problem of keeping control of the 
enrollees. If commanders shipped troublemakers out, the 
officials avoided many of the camp’s potential discipline 
problems, Since many junior officers used the CCC as a
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proving- ground for their leadership ability, some resisted 
discharging enrollees since it would show their inability 
to handle men directly.
Sometimes, these junior officers could not control 
the enrollees and older, street-wise boys ran roughshod 
over them. There were many incidents of intracamp riots 
and fighting.87 The most renown was the Abraham
Yancovitch incident at Bacon Rind Creek in Yellowstone 
Park. On the evening of July 13, 1933, Yancovitch, an
enrollee, refused to wash his mess kit anywhere but the one 
spot in the nearby stream which was off limits to the 
enrollees. Yancovitch went over to the pool used solely 
for refrigeration of perishable foodstuffs, and began to 
wash his dirty mess kit. United States Army Sergeant 
George Satriano told him to stop, but Yancovitch refused 
and verbally assaulted Satriano. Fisticuffs ensued and 
Satriano asked the enrollee to take their fight into the 
woods. Satriano punched Yancovitch in the right temple. 
Yancovitch died of a cerebral hemorrhage shortly 
thereafter. The Jewish boys in the camp asked for and 
received permission to hold a vigil over Yancovitch’s 
body. In the late evening, two of the boys began to incite 
the others to lynch Satriano, who was in jail in Mammoth 
Hot Springs. The next day, the two inciters were arrested 
and discharged. One of the boys commented that his arrest 
probably prevented him from accomplishing ’’the work he had
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been sent to do.” Federal Bureau of Investigation agents 
investigated the two and found that they were Communists 
who were to enroll in the CCC and infiltrate a camp. 
Records of the incident end with the FBI hot on the two 
Communists’ trail.88 Besides these uprising in the 
camps, the local communities also had problems with the 
enrollees.
Initial attitudes of communities toward the CCCs 
stemmed from fear and intimidation. As stated earlier, 
families feared the threat the CCC boys represented to 
their daughters’ virtue. CCCs terrorized Missoula <theft, 
vandalism, rowdyism), but the CCCs in Glacier caused local 
communities few problems. The editor of the Kalispell 
Daily Interlake claimed that crime in the first five 
months since the CCCs arrived in Glacier was ’’nothing more 
serious than occurs ordinarilly C sic] in this
community." Nonetheless, the presence of CCCs in the parks 
offended the sensitivities of some Western Montanans: "Many
citizens of Missoula cancelled trips to National Parks when 
friends returned telling of camp-grounds and hotel lobbies 
’swarming with the scum of New York’s east side.’ 
Stories circulated about a gang of enrollees from a New 
York camp in Yellowstone that broke into a ranger’s cabin, 
stole his horses and raped his wife. This caused the 
people of West Yellowstone to treat all CCCs harshly. A 
sign on a bar door in Utah typified early attitudes toward
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the CCCs: "No CCC boys or Dogs allowed. ”89
Shortly after the CCC camps began work, however, 
communities near the camps began to reap CCC benefits. 
Businessmen cheered the loudest as camps provided economic 
stimulation for communities. Local food purchases added up 
to over SI,500 per month, and the total monthly 
expenditures for each camp, including individual enrollees’ 
spending, was nearly $5,000. In addition, camp
construction employed local labor. Many towns profitted 
greatly by the CCC. One community, Plains, Montana, was 
completely removed from depression standards by income from 
local producers and carpenters supplying and constructing 
the CCC camps. 90
Before camp construction began, however, CCC 
administrators had to do a great deal of planning. In the 
beginning of the CCC, FDR personally authorized all 
specific camp locations, which increased the inefficiency 
of the corps. Later, Park Service officials recommended 
sites, and Fechner authorized the camp construction. After 
a site had been selected, a company’s advance cadre settled 
on the site. Cadres consisted of the camp commander, some 
non-commissioned officers, and about twenty regular 
enrollees. It was their duty to pitch tents, establish a 
mess, and arrange for local purchase of food, other 
supplies, and water for the camp.
As stated earlier, the average company strength for
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CCC camps in Glacier and Yellowstone was 200 men,91 
Camps that housed this many men in the woods needed to have 
enough support buildings to keep the camp operating 
smoothly. The ideal camp contained twenty-four
buildings.92 One of the criticisms of the 200-man camps 
was that they were too inflexible— some work projects 
demanded less men, but were far from camp in the back 
country. Most of these criticisms came from those 
officials who sought to make full use of the CCC to develop 
more of the wild areas in the parks. To solve this 
problem, Roosevelt and Fechner authorized the establishment 
of side ("spike” ) camps.
These small side camps, holding from twenty to fifty 
enrollees, were meant for the sole use of the technical 
agencies, and only when absolutely necessary to complete a 
particular project. Fechner transferred the administration 
of spike camps from the Army to the technical agencies. He 
insisted that spike camps provide "all the facilities and 
opportunities that a main camp afforded."93 There were, 
however, no educational advisors or doctors, and seldom a 
library. The technical services could not be expected to 
duplicate all of these facilities in every side camp. 
Nonetheless, project supervisors tried to make life in the 
spike camps as comfortable as possible.
Before long, different agencies began to abuse the 
spike camp privilege. The Forest Service and the Soil
Conservation Service were notorious for this. The Forest 
Service regularly sent enrollees from spike camps to man 
fire lookouts to avoid having to pay local regular 
employees. The Soil Conservation Service used spike camp 
enrollees as clerks in agency offices. Such use of 
enrollee labor violated the original intentions behind 
spike camps. As abuse and over— use of the system 
increased, some CCC officials claimed that side camps were 
more trouble than they were worth because of supply and 
medical care requirements. Feeding the critics* fire was 
the fact that spike camps always cost more per enrollee
than main camps. In the face of these conditions, Fechner
ordered all spike camps closed on May 7, 1942.91
Inefficient or not, Park Service administrators put both
spike and regular camps, and the money they brought with
them, to use in the Park Service’s plans for the 
development of Glacier and Yellowstone National 
Parks.
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CHAPTER 3:
The Enrollees at Work in Glacier and Yellowstone
As stated earlier, the Park Service developed "master 
plans” for all of the national parks before the CCC had 
been established. Using these plans, drawn up to map the 
course of future park operations and development, and 
backed by the huge injection of CCC funds and manpower, the 
Park Service engaged in an extensive agenda of work and 
development projects throughout both Glacier and 
Yellowstone Parks.
At the beginning of the CCC experiment, park 
administrators were not quite sure of the potential 
projects that the CCC could handle. In fact, Yellowstone 
officials believed that the CCC would be able to work on 
only mountain pine beetle eradication projects. The CCC, 
however, proved to be much more versatile. Author Nancy 
Ouderkirk claimed that in the corps' nine and one-half 
years, the three million men of the CCC executed over half 
of the forest planning and development projects performed 
in the history of the nation.95
Before the enrollees could begin work on these forest 
improvement and development projects, most of the young men 
needed to prepare physically and mentally for their work in 
the woods. Since many of those entering the corps were
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undernourished, a regimen of good food and healthy exercise 
in special conditioning camps strengthened their bodies for 
the rigors of life in the woods. Conditioning camps also 
helped the young men adjust to communal living. However, 
the three to four weeks that the new enrollees spent in 
these conditioning camps slowed the Park Service’s plans 
for CCC development of the parks.
Even after the CCCs became accustomed to work in the 
woods, several factors slowed the progress of work projects 
in both Glacier and Yellowstone. Three chronic conditions, 
particularly in Yellowstone, hampered progress.
Yellowstone Superintendent Roger W. Toll repeatedly 
reported that low numbers of men available for work slowed 
work in Yellowstone. Sickness, injury, and adjustment 
periods at the end of each enrollment period and before 
replacements arrived all combined to reduce the number of 
men available for work. Later, a loss of men due to the 
wartime build-up also reduced company sizes. Toll, in his 
January, 1942 monthly report, stated that ”a sample 
contingent of approximately fifty men were available for 
CCC activities....” instead of the normal work contingent 
of 130-150 per camp.96
Another situation that hobbled CCC efforts on 
projects in the parks was a lack of equipment, particularly 
trucks. When companies shipped out of the summer camps in 
Glacier and Yellowstone in the late autumn, trucks and
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other equipment either went with them, or the CCC 
administrators sent the trucks to other CCC camps in the 
East or South. Getting the trucks back proved difficult at 
times. Priority projects had to be postponed when the 
enrollees returned to the parks because there were not 
enough trucks to take the enrollees to the work sites. 
Consequently, crews worked around the camps, or on trail 
projects adjacent to the camps.97
A lack of supervisory personnel also slowed progress 
in both Glacier and Yellowstone. During the later years 
especially, qualified supervisory personnel were
increasingly rare. In 1941, for example, GNP-1 and GNP-7 
shared a project supervisor for several months.98
In spite of these hinderances, the CCC boys completed 
a wide variety of work projects. These projects fell into 
two basic categories: ” Improvement” and "Protection.”
" Improvements" were the major projects for park 
administrators’ plans for development.
One of the primary ’’improvement” projects the CCC 
undertook was one FDR held near and dear to his heart. 
Roosevelt recognized the value of reforestation at his 
estate on the Hudson River, Hyde Park, where his 
reforestation project had increased the real and potential 
value of the once profitable corn fields of the estate. He 
recognized that reforestation could renew the value of the 
nation’s forests and also make them profitable, as it had
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done to Hyde Park.
Reforestation included many projects beyond simple 
tree planting. The entire process began with seed
collecting. Enrollees collected pine cones, dried them in 
kilns or out in the sun, agitated the cones to free the 
seeds, removed the seed wings by passing them through 
screens, and packed the seeds for spring planting. Before 
planting began, the enrollees had to build nurseries. 
Construction of one of the CCC nurseries near the Game 
Ranch in Yellowstone occupied enrollees for months. 99
Enrollees assigned to nursery duty planted seeds in 
the spring. By 1937, one 18-acre CCC nursery in
Yellowstone produced 500,000 seedling a year for CCC 
reforestation projects. This nursery grew lodgepole pines, 
Douglas firs, birches, willows, aspens, and poplars.100
CCC reforestation projects concentrated on 
campgrounds and vast areas of burned forest. Glacier 
enrollees spent a large part of 1938 planting aspens, 
willows, and cottonwoods in and around the Many Glacier 
campground to rejuvenate the fire scar left by the huge 
1936 Heaven’s Peak Fire. In 1939, enrollees planted over 
15,000 seedlings in the Many Glacier campground 
alone.101 The Sprague Creek campground in Glacier also 
benefited from extensive reforestation efforts.
The nursery near the Game Ranch closed in May, 1941. 
The CCC shipped all of the seedlings from that nursery to
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Glacier. Of them, 50,000 2 ’—3 ’ lodgepole pines,
cottonwoods, and shrubs found homes in the Many Glacier 
campground and the Fish Creek campground. Reforestation of 
the Many Glacier area continued into the last days of the 
CCC in 1942. In that year alone, the enrollees planted 
43,765 3 ’-4* lodgepole pines in the Many Glacier area. One 
authority estimated that the total of trees planted by the
CCC nationally was over 2 1 356 , 000, 000, of which the CCCs
planted 425,175,000 in 1936 alone,102
Tree planting played a major role in making many
areas, particularly campgrounds, more attractive for
visitors (the primary goal of park development plans). The 
second major "improvement” project, campground development, 
was also aimed at making the parks more attractive and
comfortable for visitors.
Railroads had dominated the transportation industry 
since the mid-nineteenth century and had controlled the 
passenger trade to Glacier and Yellowstone since the parks 
were established. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
however, fewer and fewer tourists traveled on the
railroads. In 1915, 51,895 visitors flocked to
Yellowstone, of which only 7,418 arrived by car; the 
remainder rode the rails to the park. In 1930, however, 
194,771 people entered Yellowstone by car while only 26,845 
arrived at the park by train. 103 The 1930s had witnessed 
the ascendency of the individual automobile as the
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preferred form of transportation for park visitors. The 
shift effected profound changes in the parks by changing 
both the typical park visitor and the activities he 
enjoyed. As the numbers of this "new breed” of visitor 
increased, park administrators planned to increase the 
parks* facilities designed to accommodate them.
In Glacier, campground development centered around 
five major campgrounds: Sprague Creek, Avalanche, Roes
Creek, Many Glacier, and Two Medicine. Yellowstone 
campground development projects involved Mammoth Hot 
Springs (the major project), Vest Thumb, Canyon, Tower
Falls, Lake, and Fishing Bridge campgrounds. In each of 
these areas, and in many minor campgrounds, Park Service 
landscape architects oversaw the projects ”to see that the 
work [carried] out the ideal of greater beauty and
utility. ”104
** Utility” was the key word for campground 
development. Development and general expansion involved 
paving the forest for parking spaces to accomodate the new 
onslaught of automobiles, building and improving roads,
relocating the trails around the project areas, and
developing the water and sewer lines to accommodate the 
increased bathing facilities and comfort stations. 
Enrollees also equipped the campgrounds with new picnic 
tables and benches, fireplaces and barbeque grills, new 
garbage dumps and pit toilets.
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CCC campground development projects had a tremendous 
effect on visitation in these parks. Park Service and CCC 
officials seemed to measure the success of CCC works by 
increases in the numbers of visitors in the parks. As 
early as 1934, Fechner received reports that ’’the work of 
the CCC... made it possible for park authorities to 
accomodate virtually all of the large influx of visitors” 
to the parks. In 1938, Fechner again reported that
’’National Park superintendents report twenty-five per cent, 
fifty, one hundred, three hundred, and in some cases, even 
five hundred per cent increases in visitor accommodations 
in their areas,” and that campground development and 
enlargement have been ’’making it easier and more pleasant 
for men, women, and children to visit and enjoy America’s 
most scenic and historic spots. ”,os
Supplied with this huge expansion of facilities, Park 
Service administrators wanted even more. Park Service
officials predicted that they needed 10-20 years of work by 
the CCC to ’’complete” the parks’ facilities. This was over
and above the fact that the Park Service had stated in 1935
that ’’through Emergency Conservation Work, the development 
of the Nation’s recreational areas Chad] been advanced 
farther than would have been possible in 10 to 20 years 
under the old order....” Campground development projects 
exemplified administrators’ attitudes toward the national 
parks: a greater emphasis on construction and development
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with less attention paid to the natural, yet primitive 
scene. 106 Development in favor of visitor comfort and 
access had come at the expense of the preservation of 
natural habitat.
Another CCC ’’improvement” project that exhibited this 
emphasis on development over preservation in the national 
parks was general construction. The CCC boys worked on
construction projects under the supervision of experienced 
carpenters and contractors. In spite of this supervision, 
the CCCs were not as efficient at construction projects as 
were professionals. Frank A. Kittredge, the regional CCC 
director, claimed that the work of ”a number of enrollees 
will not exceed more than the production of one experienced 
workman in private practice.”’07 These handicaps
notwithstanding, the CCC boys built a variety of structures 
throughout Glacier and Yellowstone Parks. While CCC funds 
provided the Park Service with a unique opportunity to 
develop facilities in these parks, undoubtedly some of the 
construction in these parks would have been completed 
without CCC money through regular Park Service 
appropriations. The CCC, however, provided funds that 
freed regular appropriations for the completion of other 
proj ects.
The Park Service benefited from the CCC in another 
way. The CCC enrollees proved valuable by freeing regular 
park employees to perform other tasks. For instance,
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enrollees performed visitor contact duties in these two 
parks. In Yellowstone, a lack of certified park service 
personnel at popular sites resulted in rampant fish limit 
violations. To solve this problem, CCC boys manned
entrance stations, thus freeing rangers to be more visible 
to the visitors. 108
Another of these contact services placed enrollees in 
park museums. In these museums, enrollees not only manned 
desks and guided tours, but they also helped out in the 
museum laboratories. Enrollees helped curators mount 
animals and arrange exhibits for display cases. Also, CCC 
wildlife technicians directed CCC enrollees in performing 
autopsies of dead animals to help study animal disease 
control. 109
Other than this lab work, CCC enrollees undertook a 
great many other wildlife development projects. In 
Glacier, enrollees built fish hatching ponds, worked at 
hatcheries, and restocked Glacier’s well-fished streams. 
Yellowstone’s wildlife projects centered around that park’s 
unique elk herds.
CCC elk projects basically involved herd 
maintenance. Enrollees worked on forest stand improvement 
to provide more browse and better cover for the animals. 
In the winter, CCCs fed the large herds with hay stored in 
the summer and autumn. These herd maintenance projects, 
combined with early park administrators’ programs that
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favored the elimination of the elk’s natural predators 
brought about an explosion in elk herd populations.
The major herd maintenance project the CCCs performed 
to deal with these tremendous numbers of elk was the annual 
culling of the herd. CCCs established spike camps in
January at Lower Slough Creek Ranch to help with the cull.
Enrollees built elk traps into which mounted park employees 
drove the elk. Once the CCCs caught the elk, Park Service 
technicians examined the animals to determine their fate. 
The CCC boys slaughtered some of the animals. The
government, through the Park Service, distributed the meat 
from the slaughter to Indian reservations throughout 
Montana and Wyoming, Technicians determined other animals 
to be healthy, yet excess to the herd. CCC and Park 
Service trucks transported these animals live to the Crow 
Indian reservation in southern Montana. 110
Enrollees at a three-man spike camp at the Dome 
Mountain Ranger Station, near Carabella and Gardiner,
operated a check point for elk killed in regular season 
hunts near Yellowstone. These Park Service CCC enrollees 
worked in cooperation with the Montana Fish & Game 
Commission and the United States Forest Service. in
One of the major ’’improvement” projects the CCC 
undertook involved aspects of both improvement and 
protection. CCC road and trail projects afforded not only 
developed recreational opportunities for tourists, but they
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also aided in the control of forest fires. Demands for 
road and trail improvements were perennial. Increasing 
motor travel to and through the parks compounded these 
demands. CCC labor helped meet these demands, not only by 
building the roads and trails but again by freeing regular 
park employees from many of their usual activities, giving 
them more time for road and trail development. Also, CCC 
funds allowed these parks to open trails for which the 
regular park appropriations were insufficient. However,
many people criticized the use of CCC labor on tourist
trail projects.
George T. Hopper, Glacier’s Assistant Engineer,
claimed that ’’the use of CCC laborers is not. . , C as] 
adaptable to trail work as other projects because of the 
short hours [they work], and the isolated nature of the 
work,” referring to the travel time to and from the camps. 
One trail crew from GNP-4, at work on a trail from Many 
Glacier to Crocker Lake walked some ten miles getting to 
and from the project site.112
Regardless of these handicaps, CCCs spent much of 
their time in these parks cutting trails. Road and trail 
work in both Glacier and Yellowstone stretched from East to 
Vest and North to South, and from the beginning to the end
of the CCC stay in these parks. Besides building new
trails, CCC boys improved and maintained existing trails. 
The Howard Eaton Horse Trail along Yellowstone’s Grand Loop
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Road is one good example of trail improvement. CCC boys 
spent part of each summer on this 157-mile trail blasting 
out tripping hazards (rocks and logs) and grading for a 
more comfortable ride. 113 Of much more importance to 
these parks than tourist trails were the fire trails vital 
to the protection of the parks* forests.
"Protection,” as far as these parks are concerned 
dealt ultimately with the prevention and combat of fire. 
Conrad L. Virth, the Department of the Interior’s first 
representative on the CCC Advisory Council, in his 1944 
report to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, 
summarized the CCC fire trail work in the parks in this
way: ’’The National Park Service benefited immeasurably by
the Civilian Conservation [Corps’] building of many greatly 
needed fire trails,..,"1U Fire control requires that 
suppression measures be applied to a blaze during the first 
minutes of the fire. Fire trails allowed fire fighters to 
get as close to a fire as possible as quickly as possible.
Fire trails remained a top priority of park 
administrators, although the same criticisms cropped up 
about CCC fire trail work as developed concerning tourist
trail projects. Glacier Superintendent Eivind Scoyen
complained that the limits on CCC labor, such as the amount 
of time they could work, hindered the progress of CCC fire 
trail efforts. Many of the ’’vital” fire trails planned
were in the back country, where spike camps were necessary,
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and where there were no established roads. The limits on 
spike camps and road construction in the backcountry
reduced the CCC fire trail usefulness to a minimum. 1,5
Scoyen was not the only person criticizing CCC fire 
trail efforts. A hiker named Raymond Torrey claimed in the 
New York Times that such projects "invade the integrity” 
of wild lands and preserves and were ”out of line” with the 
intentions behind the establishment of parks and other 
preserves. 116 CCC and Park Service officials saw the 
situation differently: improvement was more important than
preservat ion.
By 1930, tree diseases and insects attacked and
killed more trees than did fire. White Pine Blister Rust
eradication was a major CCC protection project in Glacier 
and Yellowstone. White Pine Blister Rust eradication 
efforts in Glacier and Yellowstone had preceded formation 
of the CCC. Park Service Glacier employees began
eradication as soon as appropriations allowed, starting in 
the early 1930s.
White Pine Blister Rust is a fungus that enters white 
pine trees through their needles. Once inside the tree, 
the fungus spreads down the trunk and eventually girdles 
the tree, killing it. If the girdling does not kill the 
host tree, complete defoliation eventually does. The first 
signs of an infection in a tree do not show up for three
years after infestation.
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One characteristic of the fungus that makes the 
eradication of White Pine Blister Rust easy is the fungus' 
particular life cycle. The rust needs an alternate host 
for incubation of the spores that attack the pines. Bushes 
of the genus Fibes, gooseberries and currents, are the 
only suitable alternate hosts for this fungus. Therefore, 
elimination of Fibes bushes in an area makes the white 
pines in that area safe from White Pine Blister Rust.
The CCCs used three main methods for eradicating 
Fibes bushes. The most common method of attack was to 
pull the bushes up by hand or with a "grubbing” tool. This 
was difficult work, since all of the roots had to be 
removed, or the plant would grow back fairly rapidly. 
Second, in areas where the Fibes were hard to reach, CCCs 
sprayed the plants with either a mixture of sodium chlorate 
and calcium chloride, or diesel oil. For this method, the 
enrollees wore the same backpack-mounted pump as they did 
for fire fighting. Finally, if the area to be worked was 
large, enrollees used bulldozers to scrape up the roots of 
the bushes. In these large areas, CCC boys seeded the 
scraped areas to grass, since Fibes cannot easily grow in 
grass.
There are restrictions to effective White Pine 
Blister Rust eradication efforts. Effective control work 
can only be attempted for a few months out of the year, 
while the Fibes are in leaf and the rust spores are
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viable. Eradication efforts undertaken either earlier or 
later can leave dormant spores or parts of the bushes 
intact. For the greatest protection, white pine stands 
should undergo eradication efforts every five years to 
catch any bushes missed and those grown from seed in the 
soil. This requirement frustrated park administrators in 
Glacier and Yellowstone since they did not know if they 
would have access to CCC crews every five years. Further 
frustration resulted when CCC crews had to leave White Pine 
Blister Rust eradication projects to fight fires. Besides 
the CCC boys * efforts at eradication of White Pine Blister 
Rust in Glacier and Yellowstone Parks, the enrollees 
battled another threat to the parks’ forests: insect
infestations.
Insects posed a formidable threat to America’s 
forests. Experts estimated that by 1939, bark beetles 
destroyed over 5,000,000,000 (billion) board-feet of 
standing timber annually. These insects brought a greater 
’’drain of commercial pine timber than has been sustained 
from any other destructive agency.” Bark beetles attacked 
trees by digging through the bark and laying eggs. The 
larvae killed the trees by burrowing through the wood just 
below the bark, girding the tree. 1,7
Each of the three main species of beetles that 
endangered Glacier’s and Yellowstone’s forests attacked a 
different tree species. The Western Pine Beetle
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<Dendroctonus brevicomis') attacked healthy, injured, or 
felled western yellow pines. The Mountain Pine Beetle 
(Dendroctonus monticolae') threatened healthy, injured, or 
felled silver or western white pines, western yellow pines, 
and lodge-pole pines. Finally, the Pine Bark Beetle <lps 
pini) thrived in dying and dead white pines, spruce, and 
larch. 110
Control of these insects involved cutting and 
burning. CCCs shipped out timber that was not totally 
destroyed by the insects. If the timber was unuseable, 
crews burned the logs, bark, and limbs. Technical 
supervisors found that in the heat of the summer, logs left 
lyin£ in the sun could develop internal temperatures well 
over 100 degrees— high enough to kill the beetles. In 
areas where cutting and burning were not possible, 
Naphtalene or paradichlorobenzene dissolved in fuel oil and 
sprayed on trees was also effective.119
Limits on CCC labor reduced the enrollees’ progress 
on bark beetle control projects, which frustrated park 
administrators. CCC labor rules requiring enrollee free 
time on Saturdays and Sundays, and the enrollees’ 
inexperience in woods-work hampered their progress. These 
limitations notwithstanding, the CCC contributed a large 
amount of manpower and money on beetle eradication 
projects, which contributed significantly to the protection 
of the parks’ forests from fire. Fire frequently followed
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insect infestations because of the greatly increased fuel 
loads of beetle—ki1led trees. Park Service Director Arno 
Camraerer praised the CCC insect eradication efforts: ’’There
is no question but that insect—control work started under 
regular park appropriations and carried on...by the CCC has 
saved hundreds of thousands of trees. ” 120
One vital link in the protection of forests from fire 
in Glacier and Yellowstone was the CCC construction of 
telephone systems throughout the parks. A solid, 
dependable phone system played a major part in the fire 
plans for these parks. Telephones enabled personnel in 
fire lookouts to notify rapidly the fire crews in nearby 
CCC camps. This quick-response capability, made possible 
by the C C C ’s improved telephone systems, proved valuable in 
preventing small fires from becoming large ones.
CCC crews worked on phone line projects throughout 
the corps’ stay in Glacier and Yellowstone. Perhaps the 
most ambitious project of all took place in 1938 in Glacier 
Park. While most CCC phone line projects involved small
systems of copper wire and cedar telephone poles, one 
project was much more complicated. CCC crews from GNP-11, 
Roes Creek, built a 450-mile circuit of lead-coated heavy 
copper cable over Logan Pass via Avalanche Creek and 
Hidden Lake. To move the cable into position, sixty-four 
enrollees each carried forty-five pounds of cable over the 
7,000+’ pass at a time. In all, enrollees moved eighteen
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tons of cable by hand for this project. One and one-half 
miles of cable stretched from Avalanche Creek Campground to 
the 1,000’ cliff near Hidden Lake. The CCCs buried all of 
the cable from this project to protect it from wind and 
avalanche danger and to preserve the back country’s
pristine nature. One of Yellowstone’s outstanding
telephone line projects was 1935’s Firehole Cascade-West
Yellowstone phone line.«> While the CCC telephone line 
projects were important to the protection of these parks
from fire, other projects proved to be more instrumental to
forest protection. One of the two largest, and the most
controversial, protection projects the CCC undertook was 
called ’’fire hazard reduction.”
’’Fire hazard reduction” was a general heading for a 
number of different projects, all intended to prevent
and/or limit the severity of future forest fires. These
various projects fell into three basic divisions: 
detection, preparation, and prevention. The CCC’s 
detection efforts involved construction of both fire 
weather stations and fire lookouts. Weather stations
helped Park Service technicians detect and analyze weather 
conditions that would either help or hinder fire control. 
CCC crews built and operated these stations throughout both 
Glacier and Yellowstone. Fire lookouts were the first line 
of defense against fires. By the summer of 1936, CCC boys 
both built and manned eight lookouts in Yellowstone Park
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and a similar number in Glacier. The value of these 
lookouts is evident in the fact that only two hours after 
CCC boys finished building the primary lookout at Bechler 
River in Yellowstone, enrollees manning it spotted a fire 
in Idaho.’22 Weather stations and lookouts played 
primary roles in the detection of fires in Glacier and 
Yellowstone. Once the CCCs detected the fires, preparation 
work paid off.
The preparation portion of fire hazard reduction 
projects dealt primarily with the construction of fire 
caches. Caches were storehouses or sheds built deep in the 
woods where supply to a fire would be difficult. Enrollees 
built these caches before fire season arrived and stocked 
most of them with tools for 595 men, 485-man mess units, 
161 sleeping bags, 80 bed rolls, 17 ”N” pumps, 10 ”Elto” 
pumps, 2 ”A” pumps, 1 ”K” pump, 1 ”L” pump, and 50,450’ of 
hose. 123 Later, during the fire season, these caches 
proved extremely valuable in battling fires. Enrollees 
expended the greatest amount of time in these parks, next 
to actual fire fighting, in fire prevention, or 
"presuppression.”
’’Presuppression” described one of the most blatant 
departures from the conservation ideal, and involved the 
cutting of fire breaks and general fuel load reduction. 
Fire breaks are paths cut through strategic areas of the 
forests wide enough to prevent the spread of fire. Park
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administrators placed so much faith in the utility of fire 
breaks that they seriously considered proposals to widen 
some of the ridge-top fire trails to 1,000’ to provide 
effective fire breaks in Glacier. Ernest A. Davidson, the 
Park Service Regional Landscape Architect, vehemently 
criticized this plan. He failed to see the logic in
clearing and burning a 1,000’ path through the forest just
to prevent a similar fire scar sometime in the future.
Also, Davidson claimed that areas of second burns do 
reforest, perhaps not with ’’desired” species, and that the 
Park Service had no right to dictate which species are 
indeed ’’desirable.” Finally, he questioned whether Park
Service landscape planners should ’’throw overboard (even to 
a greater extent than we now do) the theory of preservation 
of natural conditions within the parks.” 124
The second part of fire hazard reduction, reduction 
of fuel loads, was just as controversial as building fire 
breaks, but was a far more major undertaking. The first 
major fuel load reduction project involved clearing the 
dead brush and trees from the flooded areas around 
Sherburne Lake. Sherburne Lake, on Glacier Park’s east 
side, is a man-made reservoir.
The Sherburne Lake dam and other reclamation 
projects125 showed how the park service administration 
’’clearly placed resource development and additional park 
revenue above the principle of preservation.”126 As
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discussed earlier, the United States Reclamation Service
received major concessions in the Glacier Park Act. These 
concessions opened all of Glacier to the Reclamation
Service, The Reclamation Service favored damming the 
Sherburne Valley for irrigation purposes over damming the 
St. Mary’s Lakes,
Sherburne dam construction began in 1914. Park 
officials continued to exploit the park by authorizing the
harvest of timber in the Sherburne and Red Eagle Valleys
for use in the construction of the dam and supporting 
camps, and for the trapping of fish in Sherburne Lake <a 
small natural lake predated the larger reservoir) to feed 
the construction crews. The Reclamation Service closed the 
gates to the dam in 1919 and only partially filled the 
reservoir. Before the reservoir could be filled to
capacity, one problem needed to be resolved. 127
The partial filling of the reservoir introduced the 
problem of the dead trees and brush in the flowage area 
(area to be flooded). In 1927, Steven Mather recommended 
to the Commissioner of Reclamation, Elwood Mead, that 
’’before flooding any tree covered land C in the Sherburne 
Valley], all tree growth and brush should be cut and 
burned.”120 Mead ignored Mather’s advice and ordered the 
dam closed and that the water level be brought to capacity. 
The Park Service did not touch the resulting acres of dead 
wood until the CCC provided sufficient funds for the
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clean-up.
Glacier s east side CCC boys spent many summers 
clearing the piles of dead wood and brush that accumulated 
along the lake’s shores each year. Enrollees began near 
the dam and removed all of the trees and brush within fifty 
feet of the shore line. CCCs piled the resulting dead wood 
in stacks. Either the winter enrollees or the rangers 
burned the "acres of piles” in the late autumn and winter, 
after sny danger of wildfire had passed. The clean—up of 
Lake Sherburne’s flowage area was, according to Fechner, of 
’’direct benefit” to the nation as a whole since it 
eliminated a major eyesore in one of the nation’s most 
beautiful parks, 129
Roadside clean—up was one of the first projects begun 
in the parks after the establishment of the CCC, and it was 
one of the last to be abandoned when the CCC left Glacier 
and Yellowstone. Clearing the brush, litter, and dead wood 
from the sides of the parks’ roads was an on-going job 
throughout the summer. Enrollees also dynamited ’’ugly” 
tree stumps within sight of the road. 130 Depending upon 
the terrain, CCC boys cleared brush from ten to eighty feet 
from each side of the road. Roadside clean-up was a 
perfect project for Yellowstone Park, since it had many 
more visitors than did Glacier (resulting in more flammable 
garbage along the roads), and, since it was a 
low-supervision job, enrollees could always keep busy when
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supervisory personnel were at a premium. Clearing 
roadsides was neither as important, nor as controversial as 
was clearing fire scars.
The controversy surrounding fire scar clean-up 
involved Glacier’s forests, since the presence of two very 
prominent fire scars in Glacier in two of its most heavily 
used areas (the McDonald Valley and the Swiftcurrent 
Valley/Many Glacier area) obviously made the project much 
more important there than in Yellowstone. Fire scar 
clean—up consisted basically of felling snags (standing 
fire— , insect— , or disease—ki1led timber), cutting the logs 
into manageable lengths, stacking them, then either burning 
the wood or salvaging it for other purposes. Critics were 
adamant about putting an end to this work. The most vocal 
critic was Dr. Adolph Murie, Glacier’s Assistant Wildlife 
Supervisor, who developed an extensive list of reasons why 
clean-up of burned areas should not take place. His 
reasons for leaving the scar as it was included the fact 
that removing the dead wood from those areas would 
significantly reduce the amount of nutrients available for 
the surrounding soils. The soils, according to Dr. Murie, 
would be exposed to the drying sun and wind, which would 
increase erosion, as would the increased run-off due to a 
lack of structure to hold rain. Burning stacks of dead 
wood would cause fire scars of their own. But most of all, 
removing the dead wood from burn areas would be eliminating
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a natural habitat. According to Dr. Murie, ’’destroying a 
natural condition in a burn is just as sacrilegious
[sic] as destroying a green forest.”131
Dr. Murie was not alone in his criticism. Ernest A. 
Davidson, the Regional Landscape Architect, claimed that 
fires spread through ’’growing, green, lodgepole pine and 
other trees just as easily, and with far more rapidity, 
than they burn the old snags,” regardless of whether or not 
those snags are standing. One historian claimed that this
project exemplified the Park Service administration’s
attitude toward the parks: ’’human demands, and human
aesthetic values pre-empted the primitive or natural
condition” in parks. 132
Proponents of the fire scar clean-up project were as 
vocal as were the opponents. George C. Ruhle, Glacier’s 
Park Naturalist from 1929 to 1941, was ’’thoroughly won over 
by the practical evidence of [the project’s] feasibility
and desirability....’” 33 Ruhle refuted Murie’s
contentions. The naturalist claimed that only volatile 
nitrogenous compounds would be lost by the removal of dead 
wood. Further, future fires, fueled by abundant dead wood, 
combined with the McDonald Valley’s prevailing warm
southwesterly winds, would certainly scorch the entire 
remainder of the valley, an area most heavily used by
visitors. Even if no fires started, the standing snags 
were a perfect breeding ground for Douglas fir bark beetles
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(Dendroctonus pseudotsug'ae') that had destroyed. Douglas 
fir stands in the surrounding territory. Ruhle had still 
other justifications for the project.
Ruhle based his additional justifications on the 
widely-held belief that standing snags were not, in all 
actuality, a natural aspect of the Rocky Mountains. Fires 
as huge as those in 1926 (northwest of the 1929 McDonald 
Valley burn), and 1929 were "almost as rare an agent as man 
in shaping the aspect of Glacier’s features 100 years ago 
C1830s].” He used the age of the cedars in the 1929 fire 
as proof. A cedar-hemlock forest is a ’’climax” , or mature 
forest which takes 250-500 years to produce. Consequently, 
fires the size of the one in 1929 must have been rare. In 
any case, the area to be cleared represented a small 
portion of the park’s total burned areas. Ruhle assured
Dr. Murie that ’’there will always be opportunity. . .to study 
wild life in a ’natural habitat’ of unnatural burns in the 
park.” The Park Naturalist was not alone in his defense of 
the project.'34
Both Superintendent Scoyen and the National Park 
Service’s Chief Forester, John D, Coffman, supported the
work. Coffman, in fact, recommended that the clean-up be
’’the first priority project for any and all CCC camps. .. to 
the exclusion of all other projects....” Scoyen was not so 
zealous in his support. His rationale for the project were 
similar to Ruhle’s. Scoyen knew that frequently
burned over areas, such as "the Middle Fork of "the Flathead, 
take many, many years to reforest. He ultimately approved 
of the fire scar clean—up, as long as project supervisors 
followed a strict set of guidelines. First, crews had to 
leave five to ten non-cedar snags per acre standing for 
cover and homes for birds (the CCC boys called these the 
’’Bird Trees” ). Also, crews had to leave small pieces of 
wood, bark, and other debris on the ground, along with 
’’occasional logs” for cover and to keep the soil from 
drying out. Paths, trails, and sawed surfaces could not be 
visible from tourist trails and/or roads. CCCs could cut 
no green trees. Stumps had to be cut no higher than the 
diameter of the butt of the tree being cut— in no cases 
higher than twelve inches. Finally, any snags with nests 
or animal homes could not be disturbed. 135
Fire scar clearing proceeded in four main burn areas 
in Glacier Park. The Two Medicine area burned in 1916, and 
much debris remained into the 1930s. The fire of 1926 was 
northwest of the 1929 fire, in the vicinity of Fish Creek.
The 1929 fire burned Apgar and the lower half of the
McDonald Valley. In August and September, 1936, an
horrific fire burned from Heaven’s Peak over the
Continental Divide, and down the Swiftcurrent Valley to the 
Many Glacier Hotel. CCCs began to clean up the results of 
this terrible fire in the late autumn and winter, 
1936-1937. Yellowstone companies spent their fire
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presuppression time clearing smaller burns and removing 
stumps from within sight of park roads. Clearing all of 
this area resulted in thousands of tons of displaced wood. 
The CCC put much of it to good use.
While the CCCs simply burned a large part of the 
cleared wood, enrollees used much of it much more 
efficiently. Yellowstone had less wood to deal with, so 
most of the Yellowstone CCCs’ cleared wood heated the park 
administration building in Mammoth Hot Springs and the CCC 
camps themselves. Glacier companies shipped fire wood to 
the drought stricken communities of eastern Montana. 
Glacier salvaged a tremendous amount of wood and shipped 
much of it to the Blackfeet Reservation just east of the
park. Glacier companies used the railroad to ship poles, 
fence posts, corral poles, and fire wood to the Blackfeet 
Reservation. F.R. Stone, the Superintendent of the 
reservation, claimed that supplying logs and poles to the
Indians was "one of the finest things ever done for the
Indians on the reservation. 136 The Fort Peck Indian 
Reservation also received salvaged wood from Glacier. 
During the 1935 fiscal year alone, Glacier companies saved 
a total of 158 80,000-pound railroad carloads of logs,
poles, and posts for shipment east. 137 Not all of the 
salvaged wood left the parks, however.
CCCs used many of the sound and sturdy logs cleared 
at CCC project sites in these parks in their telephone line
construction projects. Creosoting facilities in Glacier 
produced a surplus of telephone poles. In fact, one camp, 
GNP—1, in one summer, 1933, salvaged 1,978 telephone poles 
and 117 cords of fire wood. Saw mills in both Glacier and 
Yellowstone provided lumber for CCC construction in these 
parks. In 1939, Glacier Park bought surplus sawmill 
equipment from Fort Peck Dam and Mount Rainier National 
Park. Using this equipment to process fire-killed timber, 
enrollees saved significantly on the costs of construction 
projects, From January 1, 1939 to September 30, of that
same year, CCC sawyers produced 347,071 board-feet of 
construction-quality lumber. In fiscal 1941, CCC boys 
sawed nearly 1,000,000 board-feet of lumber, and 1,686,160 
board-feet in fiscal 1942. 138
Clearing fire scars was another instance of the 
modification of the Park Service’s goal of preservation. 
This project was a clear example of altering a natural 
condition for the enjoyment of the people of that time. 
Curtis Buchholtz claimed that ’’three thousand acres of 
burned timber [in Glacier] were not left unimpaired for the 
future, but made more pleasing for those living in the 
area.”139 Fechner considered the clean-up of the lower 
McDonald Valley fire scar, like the clearing of the 
Sherburne Lake flowage area, to be valuable not only to the 
park, but to the nation as a whole.140
Of even greater import to the nation’s forest
78
resources was the CCC’s fire fighting efforts. Roosevelt’s 
dedication to the protection of forests from the predations 
of fire stem back to one of his last activities as a
healthy man. On August 10, 1921, while he was sailing
alone off the Bay of Fundy, Roosevelt spotted a fire. He 
sailed to shore and beat the fire out with pine boughs. To 
clean off the dirt and smoke of the fire, he dove into warm 
Lake Glen Severn, and then he jumped into the icy Bay to 
get to his boat. Later that evening, he retired early due 
to chills and aches. He began to experience the paralysis 
of polio the following morning, m  This account perhaps 
helps explain his interest in CCC fire fighting work.
The CCC involvement in fighting forest fires in the 
national parks was the result of a long history of
protection and planning. Federal control of fires began 
with the Army’s administration of the parks. From the 
Army’s arrival in 1886, it began fire control programs in
the parks. In fact, the civilian custodians’ inability to
control fires was one of the initial reasons for the Army’s 
intervention. In 1910, when a series of fires entered 
Glacier from surrounding forests, an Army contingent from 
Ft. Missoula had already prepared to fight them. The Army 
furnished valuable protection to Yellowstone’s forests as 
we 11. 142
For years prior to the establishment of the Park 
Service in 1916, a small group of professional foresters
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from the Forest Service directed fire control in the parks. 
These foresters began to build the Park Service fire 
control organization in the late 1920s through the Forest 
Protection Board (established in 1927 as an interagency 
federal land board). This new reorganization laid the 
foundation for CCC fire control efforts. The Forest 
Protecton Board decided that the parks were "an economic 
service in the form of national education and recreation of 
a value probably already even greater than an equivalent 
area of the choicest commercial forests.”143 This 
generous estimation of the value of park forests opened the 
door for increased Park Service fire control measures.
The CCC provided the Park Service with a source of 
manpower and finances that enabled the Service to implement 
the increased fire protection plans of the Forest 
Protection Board. One result of this supplemental money 
was an expanded Park Service fire organization. In 1929, 
the total Park Service fire organization consisted of one 
national fire officer, one special fire crew at Glacier 
Park, and a fire guard at Sequoia National Park. After the 
establishment of the CCC, however, the Park Service hired 
7,000 new employees, ”a figure not exceeded even in the 
early 1970s,” for logistical support and administrative 
services of the Park Service fire organization. 144
The Park Service relied heavily upon the Forest 
Service for fire protection. There were no "foresters” in
the Park Service. They all came from forestry schools or 
the Forest Service. Also, the Park Service adopted Forest 
Service techniques for fighting fires— lookouts, fire roads 
and trails, and a solid telephone system. There remained, 
however, fundamental philosophical differences concerning 
fire control between the two agencies, which were reflected 
in the directors’ backgrounds. Gifford Pinchot prided 
himself on being a professional forester, while Stephen 
Mather gained early repute in business advertising and 
promotion. These different backgrounds help explain their 
different approaches to fire control on the land entrusted 
to them. Stephen Pyne, an authority on fires in America, 
claimed that ’’the Forest Service often regulated access to 
its lands as a means of controlling fire; the Park Service 
tended to promote access, even at the risk of fire.”145 
In either case, both agencies used the CCC fire fighters as 
the primary means of controlling fire in the 1930s.
The changes in United States fire fighting policies 
in the early twentieth century was one reason that the men 
of the CCC could assume their roles as fire fighters as 
easily as they did. Most of these changes dealt with the 
Forest Service. As stated above, the Park Service derived 
Park Service fire strategies and tactics from Forest 
Service policies. The Weeks Act was the first of these
policy changes. In 1911, Congress passed the Weeks Act, 
which provided for cooperative fire protection between the
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various states. This act unified forest fire control 
policy by stating that the Forest Service had "to cooperate 
with any State or group of states, when requested to do 
so,” to protect the watersheds of navigable streams.”146 
The Weeks Act also authorized Congress to purchase forest 
lands on headwaters for the protection of watersheds.
The Clarke-McNary Act, 1924, broadened the Weeks 
Act. Cooperation now extended from watersheds of navigable 
streams ”to any timbered or forest producing lands within 
the co-operating States.” The Clarke-Mcnary Act, also 
known as the Cooperative Forest Protection Act, authorized 
the use of federal labor on forest fires and 
pre—suppression on privately owned lands, bringing the 
total amount of land protected under this act to 236 
million acres. The federal power to purchase lands also 
broadened. The government could buy land for timber 
production, not just for the protection of watersheds, as 
the Weeks Act stipulated. 14?
Two fires in particular brought forth the third 
policy change. On August 17, 1933, Director Fechner
authorized, for the first time, the use of CCC labor in
actual fire fighting on a fire near Craig, Montana. This 
set a precedent of the use of CCC* s which remained
throughout the corps’ existence. The second fire that
affected fire policy was the huge Tillamook Burn of late 
August, 1933. This fire, which scorched Tillamook County
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on Oregon’s Pacific coast, inaugurated the first 
committment of a large-scale contingent of CCCs on fire 
lines ’’collectively their real baptism by fire."148 The 
manpower and money that the CCC supplied forced a 
restructuring of fire attack plans, resulting in the third 
major change in fire policy, the 10 A.M. Policy.
The 10 A.M. Policy of 1934, which dealt not with the 
areas to be protected, but with the strategy behind 
battling fire, was a direct result of the CCC involvement 
in the Tillamook Burn. This policy dictated that fires not 
controlled by the initial attack were to be analyzed and 
planned out: ’’each succeeding day will be planned and
executed with an aim, without reservation, of obtaining 
control Cof the blaze] before ten o ’clock of the next 
morning.” The CCC involvement in the Tillamook fire was 
the first time entire organized crews fought fire instead 
of the older method of a huge effort of semi-organized 
individuals. Pyne claimed that this CCC involvement was a 
revolution in fire control. He claimed that CCC fire work 
was not only a revolution, but that it was the basis for 
’’practically all of the organized crews so essential to 
modern fire control.”149
These organized crews of CCC fire fighters were 
absolutely essential to the parks, since administrators 
viewed fire as a top-priority problem. So vital was 
effective fire control to the park administration, that CCC
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fire organization directives stipulated "that ’’the 
suppression of fires "takes precedence over any ofher park 
activities, except "the safeguarding of human life.” 
Moreover, CCC crews were subject "to emergency calls by 
project superintendents on any day, twenty-four hours a 
day. 150
The CCC enrollees were not well trained at first.
CCCs first received formal fire training in July, 1933. 
This training was not as effective as some park 
administrators would have liked. In 1936, Glacier’s 
Superintendent Scoyen criticized the CCC training. He 
cited a fire on Chief Mountain that two CCC enrollees
failed to contain. Scoyen claimed that one well—trained 
Park Service firefighter could have provided more 
protection than the two CCCs. In 1936, in an attempt to 
improve fire training, the CCC inaugurated a formal
training system nationwide. Glacier and Yellowstone 
officials provided training to all enrollees, unlike most 
parks which trained only special squads. These classes 
continued seasonally until the Isle Royal National Park 
fire of 1936, After this fire, the Park Service changed 
its fire protection program to include monthly day-long 
classes for the duration of the fire season. 151
The CCC boys proved to be capable fire fighters when 
properly trained and lead. Fire training consisted of 
basically five parts. The first segment of the fire
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control program dealt with general fire prevention, 
including the handling of smoking materials, burning 
operations, fire hazard reduction activities, and public 
fire prevention contact work. The second phase of training 
insured safe handling and inspection of fire control tools 
and equipment, and efficient fire crew organization. 
Safety on the fire lines was the third and last lesson for 
the general enrollees. Select enrollees received further 
direction on the use of pumpers, radios, fire trucks, and 
instruction on manning fire lookouts. These enrollees also 
learned how effectively and safely to use backfires, how 
fire behavior changes at different times of the day and at 
different altitudes, and how wind effects fires. Finally, 
those in charge of handling the enrollees on the fire lines
(camp supervisory personnel, rangers, and fire guards)
received instruction on the organization and leadership of
fire crews, safe handling of men, and on thorough
inspection of fire fighting equipment. 152
The trained CCCs were well organized to battle forest 
fires. Each camp contained approximately 200 enrollees, 150 
of whom could be released for fire duty. Fire crews of ten 
CCC boys organized under an experienced leader, usually an 
LEM, and every twenty enrollees had a Park Service 
foreman. During periods of peak fire danger, one select 
crew of fifteen to thirty men remained in camp at all times 
with tools, transportation, water, and rations close at
85
hand to provide quick response to fire calls. These select 
crews became known as ”flying squads.”
Flying squads provided the first line of defense 
against fires in Glacier and Yellowstone. Two secondary 
crews of twenty-five men each also trained extensively in 
each camp. These backup crews arrived on the fire scene 
after the flying squads with fire cache trucks, a mess 
unit, pump unit, bedrolls and rations. As one crew
responded to the fire call, the camp commander grounded 
another crew in camp.
Smaller crews of ”smokechasers” remined at each of 
the ranger stations throughout the parks. Smokechasers 
armed with a sleeping bag, a shovel, a pulaski, a canteen, 
and a day’s rations arrived first on the scene to assess 
the situation. When a call came out from a lookout tower, 
the smokechasers drove to as near to the fire scene as 
possible. One man carried a radio, and he established a 
radio hook-up with two lookouts. The smokechasers lit a 
flare to indicate their position. The lookouts would 
triangulate their postion and radio directions to the crews 
to guide them to the fire. 153
In 1938, the height of CCC fire protection in these 
parks, each camp had a flying squad and a backup on call 
for two days each, and each ranger station had a small 
smokechaser crew. By 1942, however, reductions in
enrollments and the decline of the CCC forced regular Park
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Service employees to fill the ranks of the flying 
squads.
General Bedford Forrest’s advice typified the methods 
that the CCC used in fighting fires: ”Git thar fustest with 
the mostest men,” The corps employed time—honored and 
proven methods of fire control. CCC fire control tactics 
involved four ’’waves” of men. The first crew used axes to 
cut down small trees and other brush. A second crew of
’’brush throwers” picked up all of the cut trees and brush 
and threw them in toward the fire. A third crew of
enrollees used mattocks to dig into the ground to cut roots 
and still smaller growth. They dug a 6”-8” trough down to 
rock to cut the ground fire fuel. The last group of boys 
cleared away all of the ground fuel— roots, leaves, bark, 
needles— with shovels to stop the spread of ground fires. 
After the four crews had passed, ’’there was left as clean a 
trail as any hiker could ask for. ”15S
Vork on the fire lines was hard and unpleasant. When
the CCC’s chance to rest came, the was only one thing on
their minds: ”eat all you could [the food was exceptional],
take a cold bath in the lake [if you were lucky enough to 
be near one] & find a sleeping bag for a rest. Only one 
small problem— some [one] had it before you & it was full 
of bugs & lice, etc,” At night, some enrollees had to join 
the ’’night watch crew.” These boys had to walk the fire 
lines from dusk to dawn to extinguish any sparks they saw.
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One enrollee, named Arthur Youwer, while on night watch 
duty on a fire in the upper McDonald Valley, saw a glow 
coming from over McDonald Pass (he saw the Swiftcurrent 
Valley burning from a blown ember). Enrollee Youwer was 
also a "water boy," which entailed climbing down the 
mountain 1,000'-1,500' to the creek, and climbing back up 
the mountain with a twenty-five pound, three gallon canvas 
bag filled with water. 156
The fire in the upper McDonald Valley and the 
Swiftcurrent Valley burn became collectively known as the 
Heaven's Peak Fire. This fire was one of the few 
spectacular fires which, in spite of the enrollees’ 
training and organization, all but exceeded the boys' 
skills. On August 19, 1936, a lightning storm in Glacier
started a small blaze on the southwest shoulder of Heaven’s 
Peak. Lookout observers discovered the fire on August 21. 
CCC fire crews attacked the fire which swept down into the 
upper McDonald Valley. Winds quickly spread the fire to 
over 200 acres, but the enrollees brought it under 
control. On August 31, high winds kicked up live embers 
and the fire spread past the CCC fire lines. Camp 
commanders throughout the park responded with 500 CCCs. 
The next day, the fire spread across the Going-to-the-Sun 
Highway and threatened to burn the Granite Park Chalet. By 
8:00 that evening, the fire had jumped the chalet and 
spread east through Swiftcurrent Pass, where it merged with
two smaller fires (the glow reported by Youwer). The
fire’s march down the Swiftcurrent Valley continued, but 
stopped within yards of the Many Glacier Hotel. In the 
end, fire fighters, including 700 CCC enrollees, arrested 
the Heaven’s Peak Fire (only with the help of favorable
winds and a light rain). This burn ranks among the park’s
most devastating fires since it denuded one of the park’s 
most beautiful valleys (the Swiftcurrent), and partially 
destroyed another (the McDonald Valley) The Heaven’s Peak 
fire consumed a park museum, a campground, ninety cabins, a 
ranger station, and nearly 9,000 acres of forest. Of the 
700 enrollees, seventy from GNP—9, Belton, spent 
ninety-four hours on the fire lines, the last twenty-four 
in cold rain with neither shelter nor adequate clothing. 
Enrollees eventually pulled out because their health was 
’’being unnecessarily impaired.”157
One of the most tragic fires in the history of the 
CCC was the Blackwater Creek Fire on Yellowstone’s eastern 
border, in the Shoshone National Forest. On August 20, 
1938, lightning started a small fire near the headwaters of 
Blackwater Creek, a tributary of the North Fork of the 
Shoshone River, 35 miles west of Cody, Wyoming. Later that 
evening, a crew of fifty enrollees, one superintendent, and 
a foreman arrived in the National Forest from Yellowstone 
Park. Upon their arrival, they found that the fire had 
crossed a ridge into the next drainage. Two CCC crews from
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Texas and Oklahoma cut a fire break below that ridcre. 
While they worked, the wind blew some sparks that started a 
spot fire below the CCCs. This new fire went unnoticed 
until both fires flared up at the same time, trapping the 
CCCs, The fire trapped both crews, but one crew sought the 
refuge of a nearby rock outcropping (one man panicked and 
fled to his death in the flames). The second crew had no 
such refuge, and chose to try to fight the spot fire. Ten 
CCCs, three foremen, and a Bureau of Public Roads employee 
died. All of those who survived on the rocks were burned, 
eighteen critically, 159
The deaths in the Blackwater Creek fire hurt the CCC 
fire fighting organization. The Director called for a 
board of inquiry. The board found no fault with any 
organizational weaknesses, and claimed that ” in man’s
control of forest fires some accidents will occur...without 
fault or failure on the part of anyone.”159 After the
Blackwater Creek tragedy, young men began to see themselves 
as ’’cannon fodder” for fire fighting. Enlistments dropped 
and desertions increased. 160
In response to the low morale and deaths in 1938,
Fechner promulgated new stricter regulations for the use of 
enrollees on fires. All enrollees had to be better
trained, and in some situations, CCC labor was disallowed. 
In 1939, Fechner further limited CCC labor on fire 
fighting. No longer could CCCs be used as a first line of
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defense in many instances, but instead, only as a last 
resort (this was not evident in Glacier or Yellowstone). 
This ruling came partly as a result of the fact that during 
the first five years of the CCC, no other project occupied 
as much time as fighting fires. One example of when fire 
suppression preempted all other work was August of 1940, 
when "the entire eligible enrollee strength of all
C Yellowstone CCC] camps was used most of the month in
suppressing the forty forest fires in Yellowstone.
Officials of both the CCC and the Park Service
recognized the contributions the enrollees made as fire
fighters. The CCCs were excellent fire fighters, in spite 
of their inexperience. Fechner claimed that "what he lacks 
in experience is made up by his willingness, adaptability, 
availability, and numbers. His youth and good physical 
condition have enabled him to strike hard during the 
initial and vital stages" of a fire. 162 Working under 
the poorest of conditions, the vast majority of the 
enrollees performed well, if not without complaint. The 
value of the CCC as a whole as a fire fighting force was 
evident to park officials. In fact, Scoyen, the
Superintendent of Glacier Park claimed that "...the Corps’ 
primary purpose [was that] of pre-suppressing and 
fighting forest fires...." The fact that the CCC was ready 
at a moment’s notice to meet any fire with a well-trained, 
well-equiped army contributed greatly to reduced acreage
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lost to fire throughout the life of the Corps. In 1933 
alone, the CCC kept losses in the nation’s forests to fire 
to ’’less than 17 percent of the annual average loss during 
the previous 5-year period.” In the first nine months of 
1937, one of the Park Service’s dryest years to date, the 
CCC fire fighting efforts reduced losses ninety percent 
from those for the same period of 1936. In fact, that same 
year, 1937, saw the smallest acreage burned in the national 
parks since 1927. To accomplish this vast reduction, the 
CCCs spent an average of 840,000 man-days annually on fire 
fighting. The boys of the CCC spent a total of 6,459,000 
man-days fighting fires.163
Fire season usually ended by mid—September. In early 
October, the majority of the companies from both Glacier 
and Yellowstone headed for work in forest or soil 
conservation camps in California, Nevada, Tennessee, 
Florida, South Carolina, Utah, or Virginia. Before these 
companies headed south, the enrollees secured their camps 
for abandonment for the winter. Some of the parks’
companies, however, could not relax— their work continued.
The onset of winter did little to slow the CCC
boys. Although Roosevelt authorized the continuation of the 
CCC through the winter of 1933-1934, neither Glacier nor 
Yellowstone had any camps that winter. Both parks had
winter camps during the fourth enrollment period, the
winter of 1934-1935. Glacier's first winter camp was GNP-1
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in Belton; the first for Yellowstone was YNP-1 in Mammoth 
Hot Springs. Neither park had a second winter camp until 
the eighth enrollment period, 1936—1937, when two camps, 
GNP-9, Belton, and GNP-15, Apgar flats, joined GNP-1. 
Yellowstone’s second winter camp was YNP-7, Mammoth, 
established during the winter of 1937-1938. 164
The winter camps for both parks had full work 
agenda. The work projects they carried out were all close 
to the camps since the use of trucks was impossible due to 
deep snow. Enrollees used snowshoes to get to their work 
sites. The major work project for the winter camps of both 
parks was fire hazard reduction and building construction. 
The wood cleared in fire hazard reduction provided badly 
needed fire wood for these camps, where enrollees from the 
Midwest and East had to adjust to the sub-freezing 
temperature for most of each winter.
The long winter hours also provided ample time for 
educational and recreational pursuits. On days when either 
storms or bitter cold prevented any CCCs from working on 
projects, school work occupied most of the boys' time. 
Also, movies, pool and billiards tournaments, card parties, 
and monthly dances were extremely welcome additions to the 
routine. Basketball was tremendously popular when the boys 
could manage to get to the local school gymnasiums. The 
cold weather notwithstanding, enrollees seemed to enjoy 
spending the winter in the parks. 165
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CHAPTER 4:
The Corps Winds Down
The coining of the war in Europe, and especially the 
fall of France to the Nazis in May, 1940, sparked a change 
in the CCC. The push by some members of Congress to 
militarize the corps resulted in Public Resolution No, 88, 
which authorized the training of CCCs in skills ”incident 
to the successful conduct of military and naval 
activities” , including shop, blueprint reading,
engineering, cooking, baking, and signal communications. 
CCC Director James J. McEntee estimated in his annual 
report that over seventy-five percent of the CCC projects 
were the same kinds of work as engineer troops do in war, 
such as construction of roads, trails, bridges, dams, 
telephone lines, and lookout towers, auto mechanics, supply 
and procurement, radio operations, and training of medical 
orderlies. In fact, most of the 1940 report relates how 
present projects could be made useful in wartime. In 1941, 
there were 235,420 enrollees trained in skills useful to 
national defense.166
Not only were the work skills valuable to the 
nation’s defense, but the men themselves were an asset to 
the nation. Their CCC training of discipline, living with 
others, personal hygiene, and strict sanitation made them
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prime candidates for military service. General Douglas 
McArthur claimed that "there would be nothing finer than 
that the men in the CCC camps should be used as a nucleus 
for an enlisted reserve.” Fechner himself stated that by
the end of 1937, ”the 300,000 boys now in camp and the
2,000,000 who were trained before them could be turned into 
first-class fighting men at almost an instant’s 
notice.”167 Fechner, however, still insisted that the 
CCC was a civilian organization160 when he read that
ninety percent of Americans in 1939 believed that voluntary 
military training should begin in the CCC. Nonetheless, by 
August 16, 1941, all enrollees had to drill in simple
military formations. The Army had to supply at least
twenty hours per week for basic defense training, with up 
to eight hours of that twenty during project work
hours. 169 The military was not the only group interested 
in the CCCs, As the war approached, and employment rose, 
enrollments dropped radically, and young men for enrollment 
were scarce. Eligible men were caught in the middle of a 
three-corner war between the CCC, the National Youth 
Administration, and manufacturers, each vying for badly 
needed labor.
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
forced the United States’ hand in the growing World War. 
National attention shifted away from recovery to meeting 
the threat posed by the Axis. In the final eight months of
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1941, after Roosevelt declared a limited emergency in May, 
100,000 CCCs left the corps to join the Army or to take
some of the growing number of private jobs. Even before
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, enrollment rolls for
1941 showed a nearly fifty percent drop from 300,000 
enrollees to a low of 160, 000. 170
The CCC had lost its base— the unemployed— in wartime 
prosperity. The CCC organization had decayed under
dissention and weakness in the temporary agency’s 
structure. Personalities had much to do with the decay. 
Fechner’s demands for more directorial power only worsened 
under McEntee. These demands for power upset the delicate 
balance between the central organization and the technical 
agencies, which wanted to retain control over their 
operation of the CCC.
The House of Representatives sought an effective way 
to kill the CCC. Rather than going through the time and 
expense of formally abolishing the CCC through money and 
time-consuming legislation, the House merely refused to 
vote for regular CCC appropriations. On June 5, 1942, the 
House as a whole refused funds, but voted for $500,000 for 
liquidation costs. The Senate countered and narrowly voted 
a CCC continuance <33 for, 32 against, and 31 abstained). 
The House then proposed an appropriation of $8,000,000 for 
liquidation, and the Senate reversed its previous 
decision. The CCC was dead. The final termination of all
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CCC activities, including warehousing, was to be completed 
by June 30, 1943. 171
Many people believed that the liquidation of the CCC 
was not wise. One of them, Ovid Butler, editor of 
American Forests, insisted that the CCC was one of the 
nation’s most valuable forces, especially in wartime. The 
Army needed an uninterrupted flow of wood (for camps and 
for decks on ships and PT boats); fire could place the 
American war effort in jeopardy. Since the CCC was already 
organized for fire fighting, it made sense to continue at 
least that part of the corps. Butler’s opinions were 
ineffective, and liquidation continued. The CCC abandoned 
Glacier when GNP-9, Belton, was evacuated on July 7, 1942,
and Yellowstone when enrollees left YNP-16, Yellowstone 
Lake, on July 24 and YNP-1, Mammoth on July 25, 1942.172
The dissolution of the CCC resulted in a problem of 
the disposal of CCC property. There was a huge amount of 
property involved in the dissolution: 35,000 cars, trucks,
and tractors; large stocks of clothing, food, automotive 
replacement parts, and tires; and a massive amount of small 
tools ’’from screwdrivers to air compression hammers,” all 
of which are useful in war preparedness. The War and Navy 
Departments, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration 
received first choice of the CCC materials and 
property. 173
The CCC had difficulty handling this huge quantity of
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surplus. The CCC allowed hundreds of pounds of salt,
sugar, and soap in abandoned camps to go to waste. CCC 
officials burned huge piles of clothing, shoes, pots and
pans in the northern Rocky Mountain camps. The CCC
administration claimed that these articles were 
contaminated, and since they could not be sterilized, 
federal law prohibited their transportation over state 
lines. CCCs burned piles of tires, badly needed in the war 
effort, near Bridger, Montana (with ’’tread good for 25,000 
miles of use” according to one observer). Some of these 
reports turned out to be rumors, but, undoubtedly, waste 
did occur. On August 27, 1942, the Army Adjutant General
forbade burning any supplies, and ordered that they be 
donated to local scrap drives. 174
Besides these smaller pieces of property, there were
1,717 closed or operating camps, each with twenty to
twenty-four buildings. Twenty-four former CCC camps in
twenty states became venereal disease hospitals for United 
States service men. The CCC administration turned over the 
camps in Glacier and Yellowstone to different agencies in 
the government. Some Glacier camps housed conscientious 
objectors who worked in the park during the war. After the 
war, the Selective Service gave all of these camps back to 
the Park Service for final disposal. The CCC turned over
two portable Yellowstone Park camps, composed of
collapsable panels, to the War Relocation Authority, which
moved the buildings to the Heart Mountain Relocation 
Project near Cody, Wyoming in May, 1943 for use as a 
Japanese internment camp. ,7S
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CONCLUSION
Nearly three million young men benefited from the 
CCC. For those employed by the corps, the CCC offered 
food, clothing and work that most would not have had. As
with any large organization, there were those who had bad
experiences with the corps. Most of these malcontents 
disliked camp life, the food, or the work, 176 For the
majority, however, their time in the CCC was valuable to 
them. 177 An indication that the CCC had a positive 
effect on those involved is the fact that the National 
Association of Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni has
chapters in nearly every state in the country.
When the CCC boys left camp at the end of their
enrollment in the CCC, ”the men themselves were tougher, 
browner, heavier, more self-assured, confident and 
cooperative. ”178 The January through May, 1934 issues of 
American Forests included a series of ten articles from 
enrollees on the topic of ’’What the CCC Has Done For Me.” 
These articles describe the feelings of self-worth, renewed 
purpose, and new awareness that the CCC inculcated in its
enrollees. One enrollee who felt ’’rebuilt” was Ray
Johnston who claimed:
No longer was I crushed hopelessly in the rut of 
indifference through a forced dependency; no 
longer did my fingers twitch from restlessness
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nor was I haunted with worries. At last I could 
lift my eyes and square my shoulders and meet my 
fellows, man to man. 179
Another CCC benefit was economic. The enrollees had 
paying jobs, and their dependents at home received 
allotments that many times kept body and soul together. In 
the nine and one-half year CCC experience, enrollees sent 
over $662,885,000 home. Not only did the enrollees and 
their dependents profit economically from the CCC, local 
communities also benefited, as previously discussed. 180
Employers and farmers reaped a huge benefit from the 
CCC. Motel and restaurant owners and manufacturers
recognized the excellence of CCC instruction. Besides the 
enrollees’ vocational training, employers praised the 
discipline of ex-CCC workers and lauded them ’’for rigid and 
willing adherence to orders, for resourcefulness, and for 
strict cleanliness of mind and body.” Farmers benefited 
from the CCC since the Corps’ food demands were so high, 
that ’’there is no agricultural or farm industry not 
involved in their supply, and hundreds of other industries 
are involved in [the foods’] processing and handling.” For 
example, the CCC removed over 70,000,000 pounds of wool 
from surpluses. Each day, the CCCs consumed 250,000 loaves 
of bread. By 1935, farmers suppled 52,074 hogs, 6,926 
steers, 4,185,185 pounds of potatoes, 1,666,667 pounds of 
fresh pork, and 5,000,000 pounds of flour per month to the
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CCC, 181 Clearly, the nation benefited economically and 
vocationally from the CCC experience.
From the Glacier and Yellowstone visitors’ 
perspective, the young men of the CCC changed the faces of 
the parks. In all, nearly 11,500 enrollees served in 
Glacier, and almost 10,000 young men worked in Yellowstone 
Park under the CCC. 182 They completed a wide variety of 
work projects from planting seedlings to fighting forest 
fires. The park visitor witnessed the transformation of 
vast areas of burned timber and charred ground into 
newly-planted forest. These seedlings came from within the 
parks themselves, raised by enrollees’ sweat. One CCC 
nursery provided over one-half million seedlings every 
year. Visitors camped in newly-established campgrounds 
wrought out of forest. Yellowstone enrollees spent more 
than 6,000 man-days during the summer of 1938 developing 
drive-through camping sites in the new Mammoth Hot Springs 
campground, which was the primary project that summer. 
Besides building these campsites, the CCCs healed them of 
the scars fires left behind. In the years after the 
Heaven’s Peak fire destroyed Many Glacier campground in 
1936, enrollees planted nearly 92,000 trees in and around 
that area alone, 183
Expanded campgrounds in Glacier and Yellowstone made 
campground equipment and other facilities necessary. In 
Glacier Park, enrollees dug ditches six feet deep and laid
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tens of thousands of feet of water line to new comfort 
stations and watering stations. To augment the new comfort 
stations in the new campgrounds, CCCs built garbage 
facilities, elaborate fireplaces, benches, and picnic 
tables for the comfort of the parks’ visitors, CCC boys
also built cabins and cottages throughout both Glacier and 
Yellowstone, along with most of the buildings at 
Yellowstone’s Lamar Buffalo Ranch and the lower Mammoth 
residential area. 184
The CCCs in Glacier and Yellowstone also helped 
visitors enjoy these parks more by protecting the park 
forests from disease, insects, and fire. Efforts at White 
Pine Blister Rust eradication kept enrollees from both 
parks busy, as did beetle extermination projects. 
Enrollees in Glacier worked most of each summer clearing up 
the fire scars from the fires of 1929 and 1936. Enrollees 
burned or salvaged thousands of acres of dead wood in 
Glacier alone. Since there were few forest fires in 
Yellowstone and many in Glacier, the CCC concentrated fire 
scar salvage activities mostly in Glacier.
The most evident way that the CCCs protected the 
Glacier and Yellowstone forests was by fighting fires. 
’’Smoke chasers” and flying squadrons were the shock troops 
in the CCC’s battle against wildfire. Glacier enrollees 
spent 109,294 man-hours fighting fires in the CCCs’ first 
summer in the park. Yellowstone enrollees fought many
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fires beyond the park’s boundaries in the surrounding 
national forests. 185
The CCCs affected both Glacier and Yellowstone parks 
in a profound way by enabling more and more visitors to 
experience the national parks, for better or worse. From 
the National Park Service’s perspective at the time, this 
was a definately positive result. According to Park 
Service administrators, an active, interested public held 
the promise of solid appropriations. Officials sought to 
attract visitors by making the parks more attractive to 
tourists, thus drawing more and more people into the parks.
Faced with reduced appropriations in the depth of the 
Depression, any park expansion or development to accomplish 
the end of making the parks more attractive seemed 
unrealistic. The establishment of the Civilian
Conservation Corps in 1933 changed all that.
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s CCC was surprisingly 
well-funded, considering the national condition at the 
time. The ’’Tree Army” brought with it not only hundreds of 
thousands of men at a time, but millions of dollars as 
well. The National Park Service took full advantage of 
this seemingly endless wellspring of manpower and funds to 
execute its plans for development of the parks.
Some bureaucrats may have rationalised the 
development of the parks by claiming that the developmental
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projects that the CCC undertook were actually 
preservationist. An example is the idea that extensive
campground development would concentrate tourists in 
certain areas of the parks. However, the Park Service 
attitudes toward the parks, such as the parks’ need for
development before America could enjoy them, and the 
manifestation of these beliefs through the CCC development 
of these parks, were antipreservationist. Park Service
policy emphasized the ’’use” side of the Park Service’s 
dichotomous mission, to the detriment of preservation.
The Park Service has, since its genesis, walked a
tightrope between use and preservation. Today’s policies 
reflect a renewed interest in preserving the parks in their 
natural condition. White Pine Blister Rust, pine beetle 
infestations, and wildfire are left to run their courses as 
naturally-occurring phenomena. The Park Service is
currently making an attempt to restore Yellowstone’s 
popular Fishing Bridge campground, in prime grizzly bear 
habitat, to its natural condition for the benefit of the
bears. This is a clear departure from the National Park
Service’s attempt to develop the nation’s parks through the 
men and money of the Civilian Conservation Corps.
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of the Director of the BCW% April, 1933-June 30, 1935, p.
8.
Numbers of enrollees in each park were derived 
from Superintendent's Annual Reports and
Superintendent's Monthly Reports from Glacier and 
Yellowstone. These reports provide and average number of 
enrollees per camp (Glacier: 187, Yellowstone: 186), These
were multiplied by the total number of camps in each of the 
parks, from Appendix 15. These figures include the total 
number of enrollments in these parks; no account is made 
for those enrollees who re-enrolled and returned to Glacier 
or Yellowstone.
163 One-half million seedlings: Edgar M. Flowers,
article in Green Guidon, November 15, 1937, Fort Missoula
Subject Files, Missoula, Montana; 6,000 man-days in Mammoth 
Hot Springs campground, 1938: Superintendent's Monthly
Report, (Yellowstone), August, 1938 —  Press Release: Number
1938-90; 92,000 trees planted in Many Glacier: derived
from: Super int. endent' s Annual Reports (Glacier), 1941, p.
6, 1942, no pagination, and Newell, p. 224.
184 Timothy Manns CCC work summary in Yellowstone, 
May 27, 1981, Subject Files, YNPHC, see also 
Superintendent's Monthly Reports for completion dates for 
various construction projects.
185 109,294 man-hours in Glacier on fires, 1933: 
Superintendent's Annual Report, 1933, pp. 16-18. The
basis of the research materials used in this study includes 
reports and memoranda from the Glacier and Yellowstone 
superintendents. These superintendents changed, and with 
them, reporting styles, priorities, and attitudes also 
changed. The fact that the reports come from two different 
parks compounds the problem of quantifying the amount of 
work performed by the CCC. It is very difficult to 
quantify the exact number of acres of trees that the CCC 
planted, the exact number or locations of CCC-constructed 
buildings, and the amount of time that the enrollees spent 
fighting forest fires because while one superintendent 
reported that the enrollees spent 10,827 man-days fighting 
fires in Glacier (GNP, Superintendent's Annual Report, 
1937, p. 18), the Yellowstone superintendent would report 
the number of enrollees fighting fires in a given month 
(for examples see YNP, Superintendent's Monthly Reports, 
August 1935, p. 16, September, 1935, p. 15, September, 
1937, p. 16, and September, 1938, p. 16). Even within one 
park, quantifying information is difficult. Some of the 
reports from Glacier cite the number of man-hours, rather 
than man-days, spent on a fire (man-hours/man-days: for
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examples see GNP, Superintendent's Annual Reports, 1937, 
p. 18, 1938, p. 13, and 1940, p. 4.)— (how many man-hours
are in a man-day— eight? ten? twelve?)
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Appendix 1.
Public Number 5 and and Executive Order 6101 Affecting "the
Civilian Conservation Corps.
Public No. 5, 73rd Congress— S. 598.
AN ACT
For the relief of unemployment through the performance of 
useful public work, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled: That for the purpose of relieving
the acute condition of widespread distress and unemployment 
now existing in the United States, and in order to provide 
for the restoration of the country’s natural resources and 
the advancement of an orderly program of useful public 
works, the President is authorized, under such rules and 
regulations as he may prescribe and by utilizing such 
existing departments or agencies as he may designate, to 
provide for employing citizens of the United States who are
unemployed, in the construction, maintenance and carrying
on of works of a public nature in connection with the 
forestation of lands belonging to the United States or to
the several states which are suitable for timber
production, the prevention of forest fires, floods and soil
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erosion, plant pest and disease control, the construction, 
maintenance or repair of paths, trails and fire lanes in 
the national parks and national forests, and such other 
work on the public domain, national and State, and 
Government reservations incidental to or necessary in 
connection with any projects of the character enumerated, 
as the President niay determine to be desirable: 
Provided, That the President may in his discretion extend 
the provisions of this Act to lands owned by counties and 
municipalities and lands in private ownwership, but only 
for the purpose of doing thereon such kinds of cooperative 
work as are now provided for by Acts of Congress in 
preventing and controlling forest fires and the attacks of 
forest tree pests and diseases and such work as is 
necessary in the public intrest to control floods. The 
President is further authorized, by regulation, to provide 
for housing the persons so employed and for furnishing them 
subsistance, clothing and medical attendance and
hospitalization, and cash allowance, as may be necessary, 
during the period they are so employed, and, in his 
discretion, to provide for the transportation of such 
persons to and from the places of employment. That in 
employing citizens for the purposes of this Act no 
discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or 
creed; and no person under conviction of a crime and 
serving sentence therefor shall be employed under the
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provisions of this Act. The President is further-
authorized to allocate funds available for the purposes of 
this Act, for forest research, including forest products 
investigations, by the Forest Products Laboratory.
Section 2. For the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this Act the President is authorized to enter 
into such contracts or agreements with the States as may be 
necessary, including provisions for utilization of existing 
State administrative agencies, and the President, or the 
head of any department or agency authorized by him to 
construct any project or to carry on any such public works, 
shall be authorized to acquire real property by purchase, 
donation, condemnation, or otherwise, but the provisions of 
section 355 of the Revised Statutes shall not apply to any 
property so acquired.
Section 3. Insofar as applicable, the benefits of the 
Act entitled "An Act to provide compensation for employees 
of the United States suffering injuries while in the 
performance of their duties, and for other purposes,” 
approved September 17, 1916, as amended, shall extend to
persons given employment under the provisions of this Act.
Section 4. For the purposes of carrying out the 
provisions of this Act, there is hereby authorized to be 
expended, under the direction of the President, out of any
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unobliged moneys heretofor appropriated for public works 
(except for projects on which actual construction has been 
commenced, or may be commenced within ninety days, and 
except maintenance funds for river and harbor improvements 
already allocated), such sums as may be necessary; and an 
amount equal to the amount so expended is hereby authorized 
to be appropriated for the same purposes for which such 
moneys were originally appropriated.
Section 5. That the unexpended and unallotted balance 
of the sum of $300,000,000 made available under the terms 
and conditions of the Act approved July 21, 1932, entitled
”An Act to relieve destitution,” and so forth, may be
available, or any portion thereof, to any State or
Territory or States or Territories without regard to the
limitation of 15 per centum or other limitations as to per 
centum.
Section 6. The authority of the President under this 
Act shall continue for the period of two years next after 
the date of the passage hereof and no longer.
Approved March 31, 1933.
Executive Order 6101. 129
Relief of Unemployment Through the Performance of Useful
Public Work
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of 
Congress entitled "An Act for the relief of unemployment 
through the performance of useful public work, and for 
other purposes,” approved March 31, 1933 (Public No. 5,
73rd Congress), it is hereby ordered that:
(1) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of 
said Act Robert Fechner is hereby appointed Director of 
Emergency Conservation Work at an annual rate of 
compensation of $12,000, less the reduction prescribed in 
subparagraph (b), Section 2, Title II, of the Act of 
Congress entitled ”An Act to maintain the credit of the 
United States Government,” (Public No. 2, 73rd Congress), 
approved March 20, 1933.
(2) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, and the 
Secretary of Labor each shall appoint a representative, and 
said representatives shall constitute an Advisory Council 
to the Director of Emergency Conservation Work.
(3) There is hereby established in the Treasury a 
fund of $10,000,000 by the transfer of an equal amount from 
the unobliged balances of the appropriation of unobliged 
balances of the appropriation for the emergency
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construction of public buildings contained in the act
approved July 21, 1932, as authorized by section 4 of the
said act of March 31, 1933, which fund shall be subject to
requisition by the said Robert Fechner, as Director of
Emergency Conservation Work, on the approval of the
President.
(4) Subject to direction by the President, supplies 
and materials of the several departments or establishments 
shall be furnished on the requisition of the Director of 
Emergency Conservation Work, and the departments and
establishments furnishing such supplies and materials shall 
be reimbursed therefor in accordance with instructions of 
the President.
(5) Reimbursement, if any, to the departments or 
establishments for other services rendered shall be made in 
accordance with instructions of the President.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The White House,
April 5, 1933.
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Appendix 2.
Roosevelt’s Emergency Conservation Work Organizational
Chart, April 3, 1933.
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Source: Edgar . Nixon, ed. , Franklin D. Roosevelt St
Conservation, 1911-1945, Hyde Park, New York: General
Services Administration; National Archives and Records
Service, 1957, p. 150.
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Appendix 3,
ECV and CCC Advisory Council Members.
Directors:
Robert Fechner 
James J. McEntee
Council Members:
War Department 
Colonel Duncan K. Major, Jr.
Brigadier General George P. Tyner 
Major General James A. Ulio
Department of the Interior 
Horace M. Albright 
Arno B. Cammerer 
Conrad L. Wirth
Department of Agriculture
R.Y. Stuart 
Frank A. Silcox 
Fred Morrell
Department of Labor 
W. Frank Persons 1933-1938
Veterans Administration 
C.W. Bailey 1937-1943
Source: Conrad L. Wirth, Parks, Politics and the People,
in John Paige, The Civilian Conservation Corps and the
National Park Service, 1933-1942, Washington, D.C. : United
States Department of the Interior, 1985, p. 178.
1933-1934
1934-1938 
1938-1943
1933
1933-1937
1937-1943
1933-1936
1936-1939
1940-1943
1933-1939
1940-1943
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Appendix 4,
Enrollee Profile and Eligibility Requirements
The profile of the average enrollee changed through 
the years of the CCC as the eligibility requirements for 
enrollment changed. These requirements changed to match the 
fluctuating numbers of eligible young men. Initially, only 
young single men from eighteen to twenty-five years of age 
were eligible. In 1935, when FDR chose to double the size 
of the corps, the minimum age dropped to seventeen, and the 
maximum age rose to twenty-eight. The following year, 
Roosevelt dropped the idea of doubling the corps and 
reduced the maximum age to twenty-three years.
Other standards dealt with the enrollees’ financial 
background. On May 10, 1935, Roosevelt decided that all
CCC personnel— enrollees, veterans, LEM’s, and officers—  
had to be on public relief rolls. This ruling contradicted 
the original guidelines for eligibility, which stated that 
“selections must be made on the basis of the fitness of the 
applicant and the greatest possible good to the community,” 
and that “destitution in itself, is not a badge of 
acceptability.“* Later, Fechner convinced Roosevelt to 
loosen this requirement to include only the junior 
enrollees and the veterans.
These disclaimers in mind, the “average enrollee”
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f 11 fit a certain mold. He was young (most were from 
seventeen to nineteen), weighed 145 pounds, stood 5 ’8” tall 
and had an eighth grade education. He came from a family 
of six children and two parents, and had been unemployed 
for over nine months, as had his father. Many of the 
enrollees came from crowded cities in the East. Most of 
the enrollees were underweight, but healthy. Those who 
succeeded in the CCC were adventuresome (willing to leave 
home for the uncertain) and had a capacity for regimented, 
structured life. While no individual enrollee fit all of 
these generalizations, these were typical conditions out of 
which the enrollees came. While all were unemployed, this 
was common in the 1930s. One enrollee claimed that "there 
was no seething ghetto which spilled its human effluvia out 
of some manhole into the CCC. People just could not find 
work, few anywhere were unaffected.”**
* Department of Labor, E.C.W. Official Letter No. 2, 
September 18, 1933, as quoted in John Saalberg, ’’Roosevelt,
Fechner and the CCC: A Study in Executive Leadership,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1962, p. 75.
** John A. Wynne, as quoted in Barrett G. Potter, ’’The 
Civilian Conservation Corps in New York State: Its Social
and Political Impact (1933-1942),” Ph.D. dissertation, 
State University of New York, Buffalo, 1973, p. 249.
Other sourses: Kenneth Holland and Frank E. Hill, Youth
in the CCC, Washington, D.C.: American Council on
Education, 1942; and Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest 
Service, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976.
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Appendix 5,
Food
Charles Green, a project superintendent in GNP-15, 
Belton, wrote extensively in Montana Memories about the 
food in his camp. He claimed that the food was so poor 
that the enrollees were almost at the point of rebellion. 
The company knew that the Congress allocated a plenty of 
money for food and mess operations. Many enrollees
believed that the company commander, Captain Charles Ekroan 
and his Mess Sergeant were selling the camp’s food for 
their own profit. The boys put the pieces of the puzzle 
together when both the commander and the mess sergeant 
bought new cars in the summer of 1940. Enrol lee
accusations and complaints brought about an Army 
investigation, which resulted in the replacement of both 
Captain Ekman and the mess sergeant. Before Ekman left the 
camp, GNP-15’s foremen frequently went to Belton for their 
meals. Carl Masters, an ex-foreman at the camp, in a 
letter to Burton Appleton, an ex-enrollee, claimed to 
remember that:
one day at the noon meal I was served a bowl of 
soup and it had a dead cockroach floating in it.
I took the bowl over and set it down before 
Captain Ekman and without saying a word I walked 
out and got in a car and went to Belton for 
lunch.... It did not take too much imagination to
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come up with, the fact that the money for the mess 
fund was going some place other than on the 
tables at camp 15.
From Appleton correspondence with author, November 21, 
1987, ’’Redinger Collection’', K. Ross Toole Archives, 
University of Montana.
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Appendix 6.
Death rates due to disease.
Period (be low) strength
1: 200,368
2: 270,379
3: 300,121
4: 339,955
5: 318,932
f iscal year 1936 405,856»» 1937 315,899»» 1938 262,906>» 1939 275,455it 1940 268,837ii 1941 248,92611 1942 115,620
deaths: rate per 1000
89 0.8883
206 1.5238
205 1.3661
349 2.0532
141 1.7684
839 1. 97
556 1. 76
338 1. 29
292 1. 06
282 1. 05
273 1. 09
160 0. 14
deaths for first half of period, to June 29, 1935
Period: Dates:
1 June 1, 1933-September 30, 1933
2 October 1, 1933-March 31, 1934
3 April 1, 1934-September 30 , 1934
4 October 1, 1934-March 31, 1935
5 April 1, 1935-September 30 , 1935
Sources: Annual Reports of the Director of Emergency
Conservation Work, periods 1-5; Annual Reports of the 
Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, fiscal years
1936-1939; Federal Security Agency, Annual Reports of the
Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, fiscal years
1940-1942; all published in Washington, D.C. by the
Government Printing Office in their respective years.
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Appendix 7,
Death rates due to injury
r iod (below) strength deaths: rate per 1000
1: 200,368 138 1.37755
2: 270,379 178 1.3167
3: 300,121 231 1.5394
4: 339,955 211 1.2413
5: 318,932 81 * 1.0159
seal year 1936 405,856 501 1. 18»» 1937 315,899 417 ** 1. 32> * 1938 262,906 298 *** 1. 13
ii 1939 275,455 276 1. 00
i> 1940 268,837 297 1. 1011 1941 248,926 248 0. 99
ii 1942 115,620 123 0. 10
* deaths for first half of period, to June 29, 1935.
** 11 deaths in the National Park Service.
*** 6 deaths in the National Park Service.
Period: Dates:
1 June 1, 1933-September 30, 1933
2 October 1, 1933-March 31, 1934
3 April 1, 1934-September 30, 1934
4 October 1, 1934-March 31, 1935
5 April 1, 1935-September 30, 1935
Sources: Annual Reports of the Director of Emergency
Conservation Work, periods 1-5; Annual Reports of the 
Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, fiscal years 
1936-1939; Federal Security Agency, Annual Reports of the 
Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1940-1942;
all published in Washington, D.C. by the Government 
Printing Office in their respective years.
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Appendix 8.
Average Weekday Schedule.
A. M.
6:00 Revei1le.
6:30 Physical Training.
7:30 Breakfast.
8:00 Leave for Work.
12:00 Lunch.
P. M.
1:00 Work.
4:00 Return to Camp.
5:00 Dinner.
6:00-10:00 Free Time: recreation or class time.
10:00 Lights Out.
11:00 Bed Check.
Source: Annual Report of the Director of the Civilian
Conservation Corps, fiscal year ending June 30, 1937,
Washington, D.C., United States Government Publishing 
Office, p. 3; John Salmond The Civilian Conservation 
Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study, Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1967, pp. 137-141.
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Appendix 9.
Army Goals for Educational Program
1) To develop in each man his powers of 
self-expression, self-entertainment, self-culture.
2) To develop pride and satisfaction in cooperative 
endeavor.
3) To develop as far as practicable an understanding 
of the prevailing social and economic conditions, to the 
end that each man may cooperate intelligently in improving 
these conditions.
4> To preserve and strengthen good habits of health 
and of mental development.
5) By such vocational training as is feasible, but 
particularly by vocational counseling and adjustment 
activities, to assist each man to better meet his 
employment problems when he leaves camp.
6) To develop an appreciation of nature and of 
country life.
These goals will be met by:
1) Elimination of illiteracy.
2) Raising the level of enrollees deficient in school 
subj ects.
3) Providing instruction on camp work jobs and 
proj ects.
4) Providing vocational training.
5) Providing training in constructive and worth-while 
use of leisure time.
6) Providing cultural and general education.
7) Providing training in health, first aid, and 
safety.
8> Providing character and citizenship training.
9) Assisting enrollees in finding employment.
Source: War Department, CCC Regulations, Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937, pp.
131-132, para. 164 a, b.
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Appendix 10,
Punitive Authority of Company Commanders: Punishments.
These punishments may be imposed either singly, or in 
combinat ion:
1) Admonition.
2) Reprimand,
3) Suspension of privileges for not to exceed one 
week at a time.
4) Assignment of extra work within the camp on 
non-working days, but not in excess of eight hours per day 
on two such days.
5) Forfieture of cash allowance, but not in excess of 
three days’ allowance in any one month.
6) Reduction of leaders and assistant leaders.
7) Discharge (administrative) without forfeiture of 
pay (including allotments).
8) Dishonorable discharge with forfeiture of pay 
(including allotments) due, and unpaid at date of 
discharge, for service on and after the date of commission 
of offense. Deposits may not be forfeited.
Offenses where these punishments apply.
a) Minor offenses observed by those in authority or 
admitted by the enrollee committing them: 1, 2, 3 (above).
b) Inexcusable failure to perform duties: 1-6 
inclusive.
c) Refusal to perform duties: 1-8 inclusive.
d) Absence without leave: 1—6 inclusive.
e) Desertion: 7 or 8.
f) Continued or serious misconduct: 7 or 8.
g) Infractions of rules or regulations: 1-7 
inclusive.
h) Conviction of a civil court or order of a juvenile 
court involving actual confinement not suspended: 7 or 8.
i) Larceny and other offenses involving moral 
turpitude: 8.
Source: War Department, CCC Regulations, Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937, pp.
25-26, para 40 c.
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Appendix 11,
Camp Riots and Disturbances.
June, 1933, GNP-4, Many Glacier: A passive work
strike gripped the camp shortly after the arrival of 
” Italians and Hebrews from New York City and Brooklyn who
have been raised where the communists and gangsters ruled 
their neighborhoods. They have little respect for law and 
order or the rights of others. ”* They tried to take
control of the camp upon their arrival by train. They
complained about the type and amount of food, and made an
assault on the mess hall. They destroyed much food in 
their attempt to get some more. Army personnel guarded the 
mess stores at night. This group was frequently absent 
without leave and carried knives.
One night in the mess line of this same camp, an 
enrollee cut in front of LEM Joseph Dean, who pushed him 
out of line. A roit erupted, but axe-wielding LEM’s saved 
Dean. Fourteen enrollees were arrested and discharged. 
Later, the commander gladly discharged nineteen more of the 
enrollees, and the camp felt as if ”a heavy load had been 
lifted from their shoulders, in fact it was not the same 
camp. ” **
June 19, 1933, YNP-5, Lake: Enrollees refused to
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board trucks for work detail. Rangers and Canyon camp CCCe 
arrived armed with axe handles. The ringleaders were 
caught and sent home.
June 1936, GNP-13, Sherburne Lake: The commander,
Captain William Brame, was relieved of his duties because 
he could not end a food strike that lasted for six days. 
Two enrollees, Louis Pepper and Charles Whitcup, lead the 
strike yet faced no charges.
July 6, same camp: the camp utility man saw Whitcup
and Pepper in the camp light plant, off limits. The power
went out shortly thereafter, and was not restored for two 
days. Sand and other foreign matter were found in the 
generator, and Pepper and Whitcup were suspected of
sabotage. Other enrollees called them ’’gold bricks” since
they were unwilling to work.
Glacier rangers provided campfire entertainment for
the park’s tourists. These campfires were three miles from 
camp the CCC camp (GNP-13). Many enrollees were rude and 
obnoxious to tourists, and the CCCs were banned from the 
campfires. Since the camp had few recreational facilities, 
and the nearest town was thirty miles away (Cardston, 
Alberta), Whitcup and Pepper began stirring the enrollees
up again. Enrollees stormed the campfires under Whitcup
and Pepper’s leadership. Brame ’ s replacement, Captain
Waldo Tefler, called Whitcup and Pepper before a review
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board. They refused to speak to "the board, and were 
summarily dishonorably discharged for ’’long and continuous 
misconduct. ” ***
* Hanson, p. 256, ** Hanson, p. 258. *** Hanson,
P. 261.
Source: James Hanson, ’’The Civilian Conservation Corps in
the Northern Rocky Mountains,” unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Wyoming, 1973.
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Appendix 12.
Company Numbers in Glacier and Yellowstone and Explanation. 
Glacier Companies: Yellowstone Companies:
262 1220 501 586
264 1240 535 596
281 1241 538 730
298 1246 539 736
299 1259 544 1306
529 1340 550 1349
574 1341 560 1506
697 1636 581 1723
953 2901
955 4729
967
Companies’ numbers indicate the part of the country 
the company came from. Companies formed in the first corps 
area (see map of corps areas) have numbers 101-199. 
Companies from the second corps area have numbers 201-299, 
and so on. After these numbers were used up, 1,000 was 
added to the numbers. Therefore, first corps area companies 
were numbered 1101-1199; the second corps area, 
1201-1299... through to the ninth corps area’s companies, 
1901-1999.
Source: War Department, CCC Regulations, 
D.C., 1937, p. 11, para. 16 b.
Washington,
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Appendix 13,
Camp Building Specificati ons, 200-man camp.
5 Barracks, 20’ x 120’ 7.25”
1 Mess Hall, 20’ x 120’ 7.25”
1 Technical Services Quarters, 20’ x 80’ 7.25”
1 Officers’ Quarters, 20’ x 40’ 7,25”
1 Technical Services Headquarters and Storehouse, 20’
x 80’ 7.25”
1 Army Headquarters and Storehouse, 20’ x 70’ 7.25”
1 Recreation Building, 20’ x 100’ 7.25”
1 Dispensary, 20’ x 30’ 7.25”
1 Lavatory and Bathhouse, 20’ x 40’ 7.25”
1 Latrine, 10’ 2” x 25’ 7.25”
1 Garage, 24’ 5.5” x 60’ 7.25”
4 Oil Houses, 10’ 2” x 25’ 7.25”
1 Pump House, 10’ 2” x 10’ 7.25”
1 Generator House, 10’ 2” x 10’ 7.25”
1 Blacksmith Shop, 20’ x 20’ 7.25”
1 Educational Building, 20’ x 130’ 7.25”
1 Equipment Repair & Maintenance Building, 30’ 9.25”
x 30’ 9.25”
Source: John Paige, The Civilian Conservation Corps and
the National Park Service, Washington, D.C. , Department 
of the Interior, 1985, p. 72.
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Appendix 14.
80,000 pound railroad cars full of logs, poles, and posts 
shipped from GNP-1, July 1, 1934-July 1, 1935.
Logs
86 cars to Browning, Montana.
18 cars to Poplar, Montana.
10 cars to Volf Point, Montana.
11 cars to Frazier, Momtaroa.
6 cars to Brockton, Montana.
10 cars to Rolla, North Dakota.
141 cars of logs shipped east.
Posts and Poles
5 cars of posts.
10 cars of fire wood.
2 cars of poles to Shelby, Montana
17 cars of posts and poles.
141 cars of logs.
17 cars of poles and posts.
158 cars of logs, poles, and posts shipped east from
GNP-1.
Source: Memorandum to Thomas Whitcraft, Chief Ranger from
T.L. Gardner, GNP-1 Project Superintendent, July 20, 1935,
GNPHC, Box 7, file 4.
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Appendix 15.
Glacier and Yellowstone camp occupation by periods (below),
Glacier Camps
Camp No, Locat ion
GNP-1 McDonald Creek
GNP-2 Apgar
GNP-3 Fish Creek
GNP-4 Many Glacier
GNP-5 No Name Creek
GNP-6 Two Medicine
GNP-8 Anaconda Creek
GNP-9 Belton
GNP-10 (no name)
GNP-11 Roes Creek
GNP-13 Sherburne Lake
GNP-14 Round Prairie
GNP-15 Apgar flats
Glacier Camps by Period
Periods.
Camp No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
GNP-1 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 14 16
GNP-2 1
GNP-3 1 3 7
GNP-4 1 3 5 9 11 13 15
GNP-5 1 3
GNP-6 1 3 5
GNP-8 1 3
GNP-9 1 3 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
GNP-10 1
GNP-11 3 5 11 13 15 16
GNP-13 5 7 9
GNP-14 5
GNP-15 8 9 10 12 13 14 15
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Yellowstone Camps
Camp No. Locat ion
YNP-1 Mammoth
YNP-2 Canyon
YNP-3 Lake
YNP-4 Vest Gallatin
YNP-5 Nez Perce Creek
(Old Faithful)
YNP-6 Snake River
YNP-7 Glen Creek
(Mammoth)
YNP-8 Cascade Creek
YNP-15 Old Faithful
YNP-16 Yellowstone Lake
Camp No. 1
Ye1lowstone 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Camps 
9 10
by
11
Period
Periods. 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
YNP-1 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
YNP-2 1 3 5 7 9
YNP-3 1 3 5 7 9 11 15
YNP-4 1 3 5
YNP-5 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
YNP-6 3 5
YNP-7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
YNP-8 13 15
YNP-15 15
YNP-16 Approved, but not occupied due to delays in
camp construction
Period No.
CCC Periods:
Dates.
1 June 1, 1933-September 30, 1933
2 October 1, 1933-March 31, 1934
3 April 1, 1934-September 30, 1934
4 October 1, 1934-March 31, 1935
5 April 1, 1935-September 30, 1935
6 October 1, 1935-March 31, 1936
7 April 1, 1936-September 30, 1936
8 October 1, 1936-March 31, 1937
9 April 1, 1937-September 30, 1937
10 October 1, 1937-March 31, 1938
11 April 1, 1938-September 30, 1938
12 October 1, 1938-March 31, 1939
150
13 April 1, 1939-September 30, 1939
14 October 1, 1939-March 31, 1940
15 April 1, 1940-September 30, 1940
16 October 1, 1940-March 31, 1941
17 April 1, 1941-September 30, 1941
18 October 1, 1941-March 30, 1942
19 April 1, 1942-June 30, 1942
Source: John Paige, The Civilian Conservation Corps and
the National Park Service, 1933-1942, Washington, D. C. : 
United States Department of the Interior, 1985, pp. 194, 
204, 214.
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MAPS,
Map 1: Civilian Conservation Corps Areas of "the United 
States,
Map 2: Distribution of Camps in Nation, 1933.
Map 3: Glacier National Park.
Map 4: Yellowstone National Park.
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